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Even before the United States declared its independence, colo-
nists believed that their homes were their castles.' This belief had its
origins in English common law, declared by the Prime Minister of
Great Britain, William Pitt, in 1763:
The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the
forces of the Crown. It may be frail; its roof may shake; the
wind may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain
may enter; but the King of England may not enter; all his
force dares not cross the threshold of the ruined tenement.2
Timothy C. MacDonnell is Associate Professor of Law, Washington and Lee Uni-
versity School of Law.
1 LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 151 (1999).
2 Id.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 7:1
This doctrine is embodied in the Fourth Amendment3 to our Consti-
tution and is currently at a crossroads.
Advances in technology and investigative techniques have re-
sulted in the "King," or government, being capable of entering a
citizen's home without physically crossing its threshold.4 Today, the
government can hear what is being said,
5 see what is being done,6
and know what is being written,7 without a physical intrusion into
the home. All that stops the King from crossing the threshold of
each citizen's home is the Fourth Amendment and the Supreme
Court's repeated declaration that "[a]t the very core of the Fourth
Amendment stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home
and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion." 8
3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.").
I In 1968 Congress enacted the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of
1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 212, Title III (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§
2510-2522 (2006)). This statute governed wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping.
Jonathan J. Green, Note, Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: The Needfor Standards,
52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 438, 440 n.12 (1984); R. Scot Hopkins & Pamela R. Reynolds,
Current Development 2002-2003: Redefining Privacy and Security in the Electronic Com-
munication Age: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty in the Virtual World of the Internet, 16 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHIcS 675, 681 (2003).
5 Green, supra note 4, at 445.
6 See Tania Branigan, Big Brother: Measure for Measure, THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 13,
2002),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/ uk/2002/sep/14/privacy.taniabranigan?INTCMP=SR
CH (last visited Nov. 11, 2012) (noting that surveillance experts can use wave detec-
tors, optic taps, window bouncers, power surveillance, microchip implants, radiation
analysis, and keystroke logging).
7 See Hopkins & Reynolds, supra note 4, at 683 (arguing that in order for the gov-
ernment to monitor electronic mail there is usually a requirement to have probable
cause and a warrant authorizing the monitoring).
8 E.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961) (citing Entick v. Carring-
ton, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029, 1066 (1765); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
626-30 (1886)).
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On January 6, 2012, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Florida v. Jardines,9 a case that has the potential to dra-
matically impact the degree of protection the Fourth Amendment
provides individuals in their homes.
Despite its potential impact, Jardines seems innocuous at first.
The State of Florida has appealed the Florida Supreme Court's de-
termination that police violated the Fourth Amendment when they
used a narcotics dog to sniff the front door of a suspect's home
without a warrant. 10 In its brief in support of certiorari, the State of
Florida points out that police are already permitted to use narcotics
dogs without warrants in airports and at traffic stops.1 Florida and
seventeen other states have argued that the dog sniff of an automo-
bile is no different than the dog sniff of a home. 12 The claim is that
9 See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011) (holding "that probable cause, not
reasonable suspicion, is the proper evidentiary showing of wrongdoing that the
government must make prior to conducting a dog 'sniff test' at a private residence"),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564).
10 See id. at 49 (concluding "that a 'sniff test[]' . .. is a substantial government in-
trusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. As such, it warrants the safeguards that inhere in that
amendment-specifically, the search must be preceded by an evidentiary showing of
wrongdoing"); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *i, State v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla.
2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564) (appealing "[w]hether a
dog sniff at the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained narcotics detection
dog is a Fourth Amendment search requiring probable cause"); Florida v. Jardines,
132 S. Ct. 995, 995, 181 L. Ed. 2d 726, 726 (2012) (granting the "[p]etition for writ of
certiorari" as to question one).
11 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14-15, State v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564).
12 Id.; Brief of the State of Texas et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1,
Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012)
(No. 11-564). In addition to the amicus brief from 17 state attorney generals, the
United States, the National Police K-9 Association, and Wayne County, Michigan
have submitted amici briefs challenging the Florida Supreme Court's ruling. Brief for
the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 73 So.
3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564); Brief of The
National Police Canine Association and Police K-9 Magazine As Amici Curiae in
Support of Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.
Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564); Brief of Wayne County, Michigan as Amicus Curi-
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there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in possessing contra-
band, thus any investigative technique that only reveals the pres-
ence or absence of contraband is not a search. 13 The logic used to
support the canine sniff as a "non-search" threatens to significantly
reduce the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home.
Courts that have upheld warrantless dog sniffs of the home
have done so by applying a line of cases decided by the Supreme
Court that carve out an exception to the application of the Fourth
Amendment for cases involving investigative techniques ostensibly
capable of discovering contraband without otherwise violating a
person's privacy interest. 14 Although the Supreme Court has not
named this exception, legal scholars have called it the canine search
doctrine, the contraband exception, and the binary search doc-
trine.15 At its most expansive, the exception declares that individu-
ae in Support of Petitioner, Florida v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted,
132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564).
13 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) ("We have held that any interest
in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus, governmental
conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate
privacy interest."' (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984))).
14 See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000); United States v. Ja-
cobsen, 466 U.S. 109,123 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
15 See Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to
Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 424 (2005); Ric Sim-
mons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth Amendment to Twenty-
First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGs L.J. 1303, 1348 (2002). I suggest that the use of
the term "binary search" might be misleading. The line of cases from Place through
Caballes has focused exclusively on contraband. A binary search, one that is extreme-
ly narrow and will only reveal the presence or absence of a particular item, need not
be limited to contraband. Law enforcement could seek a search authorization for a
computer to find a particular file that was not contraband and use a binary search to
find that file. I suggest the exception created by the Supreme Court in Place and its
progeny is better described as the contraband exception. This is also done with the
recognition that, in order to apply the contraband exception, a binary search must be
used. Thus not all binary searches fall under the contraband exception, but all
searches falling under the contraband exception must be binary. See Leslie A. (Lun-
ney) Shoebotham, Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expan-
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als do not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in items that are
illegal to possess. 6 Thus, investigative techniques that reveal only
the presence or absence of illegal items, such as drugs, are not
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 17 To date,
the Supreme Court has recognized two techniques that meet this
requirement: dog sniffs and chemical testing for drugs.18 The Court
has never applied this doctrine in the context of the home.
The purpose of this article is to examine the controversy regard-
ing the application of the contraband exception to the home and the
potential impact of the Jardines decision. The article will begin by
examining the cases that make up the Supreme Court's contraband
exception and some of the Court's precedent regarding the home
and warrantless searches. Next, the article will examine the Florida
Supreme Court's holding in Jardines and discuss how the Florida
court arrived at the conclusion that the canine sniff in that case was
a search. This section will compare the Florida court's conclusions
with Supreme Court precedent. Finally, the article will examine the
sion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 865-66
(2009) (noting that "Courts that apply the Place/]acobsen analysis describe their legal
analysis as a 'binary' inquiry[,]" and suggesting that this is an issue because "[t]hese
courts focus exclusively on the unlawfulness of contraband possession without any
consideration of the circumstances under which the contraband is possessed").
16 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408 ("We have held that any interest in possessing con-
traband cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus, governmental conduct that only
reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate privacy interest."'
(quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984))).
17 See id. at 410 ("A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop
that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."); Place, 462 U.S. at
707 ("[W]e conclude that the particular course of investigation that the agents in-
tended to pursue here-exposure of respondent's luggage, which was located in a
public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment.").
18 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (sniffing by a "trained canine-did not constitute a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment"); United States v. Jacobsen,
466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a par-
ticular substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in priva-
cy.").
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three most probable results of the Jardines decision and advocate for
the Court's rejection of warrantless canine sniffs of the home.
I. THE CONTRABAND EXCEPTION AND THE HOME
Four cases make up the United States Supreme Court's contra-
band exception. Three of the decisions deal with warrantless dog
sniffs-United States v. Place,19 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond,20 and
Illinois v. Caballes21 -and one, United States v. Jacobsen,22 involves the
use of a chemical-detection kit. One additional case, United States v.
Kyllo, is critical to understanding the contraband exception's appli-
cation to the home. In Kyllo the Court determined that a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred when police used a thermal-
imaging device on the home without a warrant.23
United States v. Place, decided in 1983, established the primary
components of the contraband exception.24 Place seems more timid
than the later contraband exception cases. This could be because it
is the seminal case for a new doctrine or because the Court was ad-
dressing a question without the benefit of the parties briefing the
19 Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (sniffing by a "trained canine-did not constitute a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment").
2 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (finding that "[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-
detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does
not transform the seizure into a search").
21 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (holding that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a conced-
edly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a sub-
stance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth
Amendment").
22 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
2 533 U.S. 27, 34-35 (2001) (" [T]he information obtained by the thermal imager in
this case was the product of a search.").
24 See 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (explaining that the manner of investigation "is
much less intrusive than a typical search [because it] ... discloses only the presence
or absence of narcotics, a contraband item[, and] ... the information obtained is lim-
ited"). "The canine sniff is sui generis." Id.
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issue. Regardless, the Court in Place appears to establish some limits
on the contraband exception which may fall away in later cases.25
The defendant in Place was traveling from Florida to New
York.26 Drug Enforcement Agents in Miami briefly detained Place
because he was acting suspiciously. 27 After letting Place leave on his
flight to New York, the Miami Police did more investigation and
discovered that Place had given false or conflicting addresses and
an incorrect telephone number before getting his plane ticket.28 The
Miami Police contacted the police at La Guardia Airport who met
Place as he got off the plane in New York. 29 The agents questioned
Place and then informed him that they intended to seek a search
warrant for his luggage. 30 The agents offered to let Place remain
with his luggage while they sought a search warrant. 31 Place de-
clined.32 Before seeking a warrant, the agents took Place's bag to
J.F.K. Airport to have a narcotics dog conduct a "sniff test" of the
bag.33 It took the agents approximately ninety minutes to get a dog
to sniff the luggage.34 Upon sniffing, the dog alerted the police to
the presence of drugs.35 The agents then secured a warrant and a
subsequent search revealed a bag containing cocaine.36
At trial, Place brought a motion to exclude the evidence ob-
tained during the search of his bag, which the trial court denied.
Place appealed to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which ruled
that there was reasonable suspicion to detain Place and his luggage;
25 There is at least an argument that can be made that the minimal intrusiveness
prong of the Place contraband exception is reduced or removed in Jacobsen.
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however, under Terry v. Ohio, the ninety-minute detention of Place's
luggage was too long.3 7 The case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, which agreed with the circuit court that the Terry stop was
too long,3 but also went on to explain why the dog sniff did not
constitute a search.
In two short paragraphs the Court explained that the manner in
which the search took place and the limitation on what was being
searched for meant the dog sniff was not a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes.39 First, the Court noted that "a person pos-
sesses a privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage that is
protected by the Fourth Amendment." 40 Next, the Court identified
two characteristics of a canine sniff, which, according to the Court,
make it unique among investigative techniques: minimal intrusive-
ness and limited disclosure.41 Based on these two characteristics, the
Court ruled that the dog sniff "did not constitute a 'search' within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
42
It is important to briefly examine what the Court appears to
mean when it discusses intrusiveness and limited disclosure. Re-
garding intrusiveness the Court noted, "A 'canine sniff' by a well-
trained narcotics detection dog . . .does not require opening the
luggage."43 It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for example, an
37 Id. at 709-710.
38 Id. at 709 ("The length of the detention of respondent's luggage alone precludes
the conclusion that the seizure was reasonable in the absence of probable cause.").
39 See id. ("We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the infor-




43 Id. at 707.
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officer's rummaging through the contents of the luggage. 44 Thus,
the intrusiveness the Court discussed is exposure of items in the
luggage to public view. Although the Court does not elaborate on
what "public view" means, it seems likely the Court simply meant
the view of anyone who is not the owner. The Court's discussion of
limited disclosure is, well, limited. The Court points out that a dog
sniff provides limited information and this limited disclosure "en-
sures the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrass-
ment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more in-
trusive investigative methods."45
The somewhat cautious language the Court used in Place does
not seem like the first step on a path toward permitting canine sniffs
of the home. It put in a number of qualifiers on the rule it was an-
nouncing. The Court stated the dog sniff was permissible based on
"the particular course of investigation the agents intended to pur-
sue," which included the fact that the luggage in question "was lo-
cated in a public place."46 Thus, Place established a limited excep-
tion to the Fourth Amendment that focused on the manner of the
investigative technique, what is disclosed by the technique, and
possibly the public location of the item being exposed to the tech-
nique.
Given the Court's ultimate conclusion that Place's luggage was
detained for too long, its discussion of dog sniffs could be dismissed
as dicta. In fact, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Marshall appear
to argue just that in their concurring opinions in Place.47
The next contraband exception case, United States v. Jacobsen,




47 Id. at 710-20 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 720-24 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id.
at 710-24 (Marshall, J., concurring).
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contraband exception takes on weight. The Jacobsen decision trans-
forms what was arguably dicta in Place into binding precedent.
In Jacobsen, the DEA was contacted by Federal Express after
they discovered that a package they were transporting contained a
suspicious white powder. 48 The package contained newspaper and
a duct-taped tube, which the employee opened, finding several
bags of white powder.49 Agents went to the Federal Express office
and removed a small amount of the substance from the bag; field
testing revealed that it was cocaine. 0 The substance that was re-
moved for testing was destroyed during the test.
5 ' Jacobsen, who
lived at the house where the package was being sent, was indicted
on drug possession and intent to distribute.
5 2 Jacobsen and his co-
defendants moved to suppress the evidence against them, claiming
it had been secured through an illegal search and seizure of the
Federal Express package. 3 The trial court denied the motion but the
Eight Circuit Court of Appeals granted it, concluding the DEA
agents had significantly expanded the search done by the Federal
Express employees when they tested the white powder.54 On appeal
the Supreme Court reversed.55
The Court began its discussion of whether the chemical-field
test was a search by asking: "[D]id it infringe an expectation of pri-
vacy that society is prepared to consider reasonable?"
5 6 The Court's
4 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111 (1984).
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 124-25.
52 Id. at 112.
53 Id.
54Id.
5 Id. at 126.
56 Id. at 122.
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answer was no.57 Justice Stevens writing for the majority explained
at some length that "a chemical test that merely discloses whether
or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compromise any
legitimate interest in privacy." 58 He focused on what it means to
have a privacy interest that society is willing to recognize as legiti-
mate, concluding that, "Congress has decided -and there is no
question about its power to do so -to treat the interest in 'privately'
possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental conduct that
can reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguable
'private' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest."59
There are at least two striking aspects of the Jacobsen decision.
First, the decision is an unqualified endorsement of the contraband
exception-the Court provides no limitations or balancing test that
police or courts must apply. Rather the Court simply declares that
investigative techniques that reveal nothing more than whether a
substance is contraband are not searches. 60 Second, the Jacobsen
Court appears to either disregard the intrusiveness element dis-
cussed in Place or to modify it. In Place, the absence of intrusiveness
appeared to turn on the fact that the dog sniffed only the exterior of
the luggage, thereby not exposing the content of the luggage to
public view.6' In Jacobsen, the DEA agents opened the bags of white
powder and destroyed some of its content.62 This action would ap-
pear to be an intrusion of a sort not present in Place. The Jacobsen
-7 See id. at 123 ("A chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular
substance is cocaine does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.").
Id.
59 Id.
60 See id. at 121-22 ("[It is well-settled that it is constitutionally reasonable for law
enforcement officials to seize 'effects' that cannot support a justifiable expectation of
privacy without a warrant, based on probable cause to believe they contain contra-
band.").
61 See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (" [E]xposure of respondent's
luggage, which was located in a public place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.").
62 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 124-25.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
2013]
12 New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 7:1
Court explained that "the reason [the dog sniff] did not intrude up-
on any legitimate privacy interest was that the governmental con-
duct could reveal nothing about noncontraband items."
63
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, in dissent expressed
concern over "excluding a class of surveillance techniques from the
reach of the Fourth Amendment." 64 Justice Brennan noted, "[I]n
determining whether a reasonable expectation of privacy has been
violated, we have always looked to the context in which an item is
concealed, not to the identity of the concealed item." 65 By describing
these investigative techniques as non-searches, police could use
them "whenever and wherever law enforcement officers desire."
66
Justice Brennan noted that the logical conclusion of such a rule is
"Orwellian." Despite this concern, he declared his confidence "that
this Court ultimately stands ready to prevent this ... from coming
to pass. 
67
The next contraband exception case, City of Indianapolis v. Ed-
mond, was decided by the Supreme Court approximately sixteen
years after Jacobsen. The case stems from a civil suit seeking a pre-
liminary injunction against the City of Indianapolis's drug-
interdiction roadblocks. 68 The focus of the Court's opinion was not
the warrantless dog sniff but rather the City's suspicionless seizure
of vehicles at a drug-interdiction roadblock.69 The Court's discus-
sion of the canine sniff is one paragraph and can be viewed as gen-
63 Id. at 124 n.24.
64 Id. at 137 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
65 Id. at 139.
66 Id. at 138.
67 Id.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34 (2000).
69 See id. (noting that, in general, a "search or seizure is unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment absent individualized suspicion of wrongdoing").
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erally supportive of the Place decision. 70 Notably, the Court makes
no reference to Jacobsen in its decision.
In Edmond, the City of Indianapolis arranged several drug-
interdiction roadblocks at various locations around the city. 71 The
roadblocks worked very much like drunk-driving checkpoints, only
in this case, the primary purpose was to interdict drug trafficking. 72
The petitioner was stopped at one of the checkpoints and subjected
to police walking a narcotics dog around his vehicle. The dog did
not alert. 74 The petitioner sought injunctive relief against the check-
points; the injunction was denied by the district court, but granted
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. 75 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and upheld the decision of the Seventh Circuit.76
Nearly all of the Court's discussion in Edmond focused on
whether a drug-interdiction roadblock was permissible. The Court
concluded it was not.77 In arriving at this conclusion, the majority
began its analysis by stating, "[A] search or seizure is ordinarily
unreasonable in the absence of individualized wrongdoing." 78 Next,
it discussed the "special needs" exception to this general rule and
explained why the special needs exception would not apply to a
drug-interdiction roadblock.7 9 The Court's discussion of whether
the dog sniff constituted a search is one paragraph long and conclu-
sory. The Court stated "[j]ust as in Place, an exterior sniff of an au-
70 See id. at 40 (acknowledging that "[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-
detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does
not transform the seizure into a search").
71 Id. at 34.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 36, 40.
74 Id. at 36.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 See id. at 44 (declining "to approve a program whose primary purpose is ulti-
mately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control").
7 Id. at 37.
79 See id. at 40 (noting that there is "a difference in the Fourth Amendment signifi-
cance of highway safety interests and the general interest in crime control").
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tomobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to
disclose any information other than the presence or absence of nar-
cotics .... Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply
walks around a car is 'much less intrusive than a typical search."' 80
In Edmond, there is a return to a focus on the manner and intru-
siveness of the investigative technique along with the limited dis-
closure provided by it. The declarations in Edmond may have great-
er weight than Place because they are less qualified. The Edmond
Court makes no reference to the automobile being in a public place
or to whether the police had any level of suspicion that would justi-
fy the use of the narcotics dog. Instead, the Court simply declared
that the dog sniff was not a search based on the limited disclosure
provided by the dog and the minimally intrusive manner by which
the sniff was conducted.8'
If Edmond did little to add to the contraband exception, it also
did not take anything away from it. After Edmond, the exception
seemed to encompass all that it did after Place and Jacobsen, and
nothing in Jacobsen appeared to limit the reach of the contraband
exception to the home. Thus, at the end of Edmond there appeared
to be nothing to limit the contraband exception from reaching into
the home as easily as it had reached into automobiles, that is, until
Kyllo v. United States.
Kyllo has been recognized as one of the Supreme Court's most
significant Fourth Amendment cases. 2 Kyllo sought to address the
80 Id.
81 ld. at 52-53 ("[A] 'sniff test' by a trained narcotics dog is not a 'search' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment because it does not require physical intrusion of
the object being sniffed and it does not expose anything other than the contraband
items." (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983))).
82 Paul St. Lawrence, Note, Kyllo: As Libertarian Defense Against Orwellian Enforce-
ment, 1 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 155, 156 (2002); Thomas K. Clancy, What Is a Search
Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment?, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1, 33 (2006); see also
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 30, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of "thermal
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challenge that advances in technology present to Fourth Amend-
ment protections. According to Justice Scalia's majority opinion,
"[t]he question we confront today is what limits there are upon this
power of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy."
83
In Kyllo, agents from the United States Department of the Inte-
rior suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana in his home.8 4 In an ef-
fort to secure a warrant, the officers parked on the public street out-
side of Kyllo's home and scanned the home with a thermal-imaging
device.85 The device was capable of measuring the heat being emit-
ted from Kyllo's home and showing it on a screen as a color im-
age.86 The images created by the device were not detailed, and the
device could not be used to show specific objects in the home.87 The
scan revealed that Kyllo's garage was significantly warmer than the
garages of his neighbors; suggesting that marijuana grow lights
were being used in Kyllo's home and garage.88 Armed with this
information and a significant amount of other evidence, agents
were able to secure a search warrant and seize 100 marijuana plants
from Kyllo's home. 89 At trial, Kyllo moved to suppress the marijua-
na, arguing that the thermal scan was a warrantless search; the mo-
tion was denied, and Kyllo was convicted. 90 During an evidentiary
hearing, the district court found that the thermal scanner "is a non-
intrusive device which emits no rays or beams and shows a crude
visual image of the heat being radiated from the outside of the
imagers [to] detect infrared radiation, which virtually all objects emit but which is
not visible to the naked eye" to identify the use of marijuana grow lamps is "a
'search' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant").
83 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
8 Id. at 29.
85
Id.
86 Id. at 29-30.
87 See id. at 29-30 ("The imager converts radiation into images based on relative
warmth-black is cool, white is hot, shades of gray connote relative differences; in
that respect, it operates somewhat like a video camera showing heat images.").
8 Id. at 30.
89 Id.
9 Id.
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house." 9' Based on these findings, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals upheld the denial of the motion to suppress.92 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.93
Justice Scalia began the majority opinion by reaffirming the im-
portance of the home to the Fourth Amendment stating, "'[a]t the
very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a man to
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable gov-
ernmental intrusion.' ' 94 In support of this statement, Justice Scalia
pointed out that "[w]ith few exceptions, the question of whether a
warrantless search of a home is reasonable and hence constitutional
must be answered no." 95 Thus, the central question in Kyllo was
whether the thermal scan was a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 96 Justice Scalia noted that the term "search"
has a specific meaning under the Supreme Court's precedent that
does not include visual observations made by police from a lawful
vantage point.97 In Kyllo, police were on a public street when they
scanned the home, and the device used by the government did not
91 Id.
92 Id. at 31. The court held that petitioner had shown no subjective expectation of
privacy because he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home,
and even if he had, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy be-
cause the imager 'did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life,' only 'amor-
phous 'hot spots' on the roof and exterior wall.
Id. (citation omitted).
93 Id. at 40. "Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknow-
able without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search' and is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant." Id.
94 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 31 (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511
(1961)).
95 Id.
96 See id. at 31 ("With few exceptions, the question whether a warrantless search of
a home is reasonable and hence constitutional must be answered no. On the other
hand, the antecedent question whether or not a Fourth Amendment 'search' has
occurred is not so simple under our precedent." (citations omitted)).
97 Id. at 32 (" [Wle have held that visual observation is no 'search' at all.").
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penetrate Kyllo's home with a ray or beam. 98 Despite these facts, the
majority found the use of the thermal scan to be a search.99
Justice Scalia applied the two-prong test established in Katz v.
United States, which assesses whether an individual manifested a
subjective expectation of privacy and whether that expectation is
one society was willing to recognize as reasonable. 100 Although Jus-
tice Scalia had previously criticized the Katz test as being subjective
and circular,'0 ' in Kyllo he found it easy enough to apply.' 2 Justice
Scalia concluded that determining what was a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the home was relatively easy: "We think that ob-
taining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been ob-
tained without physical 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area' constitutes a search . 1... 103 Later in the opinion, Justice Scalia
summed up the majority's opinion by stating:
We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws "a firm
line at the entrance to the house." That line, we think, must
be not only firm but also bright -which requires clear spec-
ification of those methods of surveillance that require a
warrant.... Where, as here, the Government uses a device
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the
98 Id. at 30.
99 See id. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general
public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been
unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment
'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
100 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("My understanding of the rule
that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first
that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, sec-
ond, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasona-
ble."').
101 See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 97 (1998).
102 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
103 Id. (citation omitted).
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home that would previously have been unknowable with-
out physical intrusion, the surveillance is a "search"..104
Justice Scalia went on to explain why the dissent and the gov-
ernment's arguments were unpersuasive by responding to two of
their arguments. First, the dissent argued that because the thermal-
imaging device was only reading the heat signature off the exterior
of Kyllo's home, it was not searching the interior of the home.'0 5 In
rejecting this argument, Justice Scalia pointed out that such a dis-
tinction would permit the government to use powerful micro-
phones to pick up conversations occurring in a house and then
claim it was not a search because they only amplified the sound
waves that had left the home.10 6 justice Scalia stated that "such a
mechanical interpretation of the Fourth Amendment" had already
been rejected in Katz.'0 7 Second, both the government and dissent
argued that the thermal-imaging device did not reveal intimate de-
tails of the home and thus was not a search.'0 8 In rejecting this ar-
gument, Justice Scalia used sweeping language, noting that "[t]he
Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has never been tied to
measurement of the quality or quantity of information obtained ....
In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, because
the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."' 09 Justice
Scalia went on to discuss the impracticality of a Fourth Amendment
standard that turned on whether an investigative technique reveals
104 Id. at 40 (citation omitted).
105 Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("There is, in my judgment, a distinction of con-
stitutional magnitude between 'through-the-wall surveillance' that gives the observ-
er or listener direct access to information in a private area, on the one hand, and the
thought processes used to draw inferences from information in the public domain,
on the other hand.").
106 Id. at 35-36.
107 Id. at 35.
108 Id. at 37, 50.
109 Id. at 37.
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an intimate or non-intimate detail." 0 It is in this context that Justice
Scalia noted that a device such as the thermal scanner in the case at
bar, might reveal a range of facts arguably intimate and non-
intimate."' Police would have no way of calibrating such a device
to insure only non-intimate details were revealed. 1 2 Moreover, the
Court was skeptical of the very notion that there are non-intimate
details connected to the home: "In the home, our cases show, all
details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from
prying government eyes." "13 Thus, the intimate detail argument was
rejected because all the details of the home are "intimate" and be-
cause "intimacy" is an unworkable standard for a Fourth Amend-
ment test.
Justice Stevens's dissent is significant given that he authored
the two most important contraband exception cases."4 It is also sig-
nificant to note that the author of the other two contraband excep-
tion cases, Justice O'Connor, joined Justice Stevens's dissent." 5 As
indicated above, Justice Stevens argued that there should be a dis-
tinction between through-the-wall technology and off-the-wall
technology. 116 He also argued the privacy interest at stake in this
case, to prevent detection of heat going out of Kyllo's house, was
110 Id. at 38-39 (noting that it would be difficult to determine what would be con-
sidered "intimate," and even if this were possible, "no police officer would be able to
know in advance whether his through-the-wall surveillance picks up 'intimate' de-
tails-and thus would be unable to know in advance whether it is constitutional").
111 Id. at 38 (noting that a device could detect details all the way from the "hour
each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath ... [to] the fact that
someone left a closet light on").
112 Id. at 39.
113 Id. at 38.
114 Justice Stevens is the author of Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) and United
States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
115 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 41-51 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor is the author
of City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) and United States v. Place, 462 U.S.
696 (1983).
116 See supra note 105.
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"at best trivial." 1 7 Finally, the dissent characterized the majority
opinion as "at once too broad and too narrow."1 8 Justice Stevens
specifically mentioned that the majority opinion was too broad, in
part, because
[i]t would, for example, embrace potential mechanical sub-
stitutes for dogs trained to react when they sniff narcotics.
But in Place ... we held that a dog sniff that "discloses only
the presence or absence of narcotics" does "not constitute a
'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment,"
and it must follow that sense-enhancing equipment that
identifies nothing but illegal activity is not a search ei-
ther.'' 9
Based on his dissent, prior to the Kyllo decision, Justice Stevens be-
lieved the contraband exception applied to the home. Further, Jus-
tice Stevens clearly felt the rule was not limited to dogs, but would
embrace technology that could be sufficiently discerning and uti-
lized without a physical invasion into a home or other protected
area. 120
When the majority opinion and dissent are taken together, it
seems that the contraband exception would not apply to the home.
Although Justice Stevens clearly implied that dog sniffs of the home
might survive the majority opinion, all other technology-based ap-
plications of the exception would be denied. Despite Justice Ste-
vens's dissent, the majority opinion appears to deny even the use of
dog sniffs. Justice Scalia articulated two reasons why the intimate-
11
7 Id. at 45.
11 Id. at 46-47.
119 Id. at 47-48 (citation omitted).
120 Id. ("[It must follow that sense-enhancing equipment that identifies nothing
but illegal activity is not a search either.").
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details test proposed by the government fails in the context of the
home.' 21 The first reason offered by Justice Scalia is that all details of
the home are intimate - from the trivial to the sacred - and must be
kept secret "from prying government eyes." 122 Additionally, Justice
Scalia pointed to the need for clear and firm rules when it comes to
the Fourth Amendment's protection of the home. 123 According to
Justice Scalia, the line of protection around the home must be firm
and bright. 124 This, along with the declaration that all details of the
home are intimate, supports a rejection of even dog sniffs of the
home.
The final contraband exception case, Illinois v. Caballes, is the
most significant for at least three reasons. First, Caballes condones an
entirely suspicionless canine sniff, a position hinted at in Edmond,
but now fully embraced in Caballes. 125 Second, the language the
Court uses has a similarly expansive tone as the Jacobsen decision.
Like Jacobsen, the manner and degree of intrusiveness of the search
is not mentioned as a limiting factor for why the dog sniff was not a
search. Third, the Caballes Court purports to explain why the Ca-
balles decision is entirely consistent with Kyllo. 1
26
The facts of Caballes are simple. Caballes was pulled over by po-
lice for driving 71 mph in a 65 mph zone. 27 After the first state p0-
121 See id. at 37 ("In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details."); id.
at 40 (noting that the Fourth Amendment draws "not only [a] firm but also [a]
bright" "line at the entrance to the house" (citation omitted)).
122 Id. at 37.
123 See id. at 40 ("We have said that the Fourth Amendment draws 'a firm line at
the entrance to the house.'" (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,590 (1980))).
124 Id. ("That line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright .... ").
125 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 414 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("As a
general proposition, using a dog to sniff for drugs is subject to the rule that the object
of enforcing criminal laws does not, without more, justify suspicionless Fourth
Amendment intrusions.").
126 See id. at 409 ("This conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision
that the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home
constituted an unlawful search.").
127 Id. at 417-18 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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lice officer pulled Caballes over, a second officer arrived with a dog
trained to detect narcotics.128 According to the police, they had no
basis for suspecting Caballes had illegal drugs. 129 The dog was
walked around the vehicle and alerted to the presence of drugs.
3
Based on the dog's alert, police searched the trunk of Caballes's car
and found drugs.13 ' The facts indicated that the traffic stop was not
prolonged by the canine sniff. 1
32
At trial Caballes moved to exclude the drugs found in his trunk,
claiming the canine sniff was an illegal search. 133 The trial court de-
nied the motion, and Caballes was convicted of a drug offense.1
34
Caballes's first appeal was unsuccessful, but the conviction was ul-
timately overturned by the Illinois Supreme Court, which conclud-
ed that the police had unjustifiably converted a lawful traffic stop
into an illegal drug investigation. 13' The state appealed the decision
to the United States Supreme Court, which reversed the Illinois Su-
preme Court, ruling the warrantless use of a narcotics dog did not
offend the Fourth Amendment.1
36
The question before the Court was "whether the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify
using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate
traffic stop."' 137 As noted above, the majority's answer was no.' 38 In





133 Id. at 407.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 See id. at 409 ("In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of re-
spondent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on
respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cog-
nizable infringement.").
137 Id. at 407.
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arriving at this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on the Jacobsen
decision. The Court spoke expansively regarding the absence of a
legitimate expectation of privacy in contraband. Further, the majori-
ty claimed to explain how the Caballes decision was entirely con-
sistent with Kyllo.
In discussing whether the warrantless dog sniff violated the
Fourth Amendment, the Court began by extensively quoting the
Jacobsen decision. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, stated,
"We have held that any interest in possessing contraband cannot be
deemed 'legitimate' and thus, governmental conduct that only re-
veals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate, pri-
vacy interest."' 139 The Court's focus appears to be on the limited
disclosure of the canine sniff, with only two sentences of the opin-
ion devoted to the minimal intrusion of the dog sniff. Justice Ste-
vens quoted the Place decision primarily to support the conclusion
that canine sniffs do "not expose noncontraband items that other-
wise would remain hidden from public view." 1
40
Finally, the majority stated its decision in Caballes "is entirely
consistent with our recent decision that the use of a thermal-
imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a home consti-
tute[s] an unlawful search." 14 1 This last paragraph of the majority
opinion has been central to how lower courts have addressed the
warrantless use of a dog to sniff a home.142 Justice Stevens argued
that "critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device was
capable of detecting lawful activity - in that case, intimate details in
a home, such as 'at what hour each night the lady of the house takes
138 Id. at 409 ("In this case, the dog sniff was performed on the exterior of respond-
ent's car while he was lawfully seized for a traffic violation. Any intrusion on re-
spondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cog-
nizable infringement.").
139 Id. at 408.
140 Id. at 409.
141 Id.
142 See infra notes 381-94 and accompanying text.
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her daily sauna and bath.'"1 43 Justice Stevens went on to write that
"[t]he legitimate expectation that information about perfectly lawful
activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of
contraband in the trunk of his car." 144 Section four of the article will
discuss whether Justice Stevens's characterization of the Kyllo deci-
sion withstands scrutiny. At this point, it is enough to examine how
this paragraph impacts the question of warrantless dog sniffs of the
home.
Justice Stevens's opinion strongly indicates that a warrantless
dog sniff of a home would no more offend the Fourth Amendment
than a warrantless sniff of a car. This indication comes through in at
least two ways. First, the comparison of Caballes and Kyllo can do
nothing but support the use of a dog sniff of the home. Given that
Kyllo dealt with Fourth Amendment protection of the home and
Caballes of a car, most would not have thought to compare the two
decisions. If the majority was concerned that some would argue a
conflict, it could have simply noted that the Fourth Amendment
protection of a home has always been greater than those in a car on
public streets. Second, the explanation provided by the majority to
support the claimed consistency between the cases comes from the
distinction between the investigative techniques employed in each
case and has nothing to do with the distinction between a home and
a car. In Kyllo, the investigative technique was too broad, detecting
lawful activity as well as unlawful. In Caballes, however, the inves-
tigative technique was allegedly more refined, detecting only illegal
items. Thus, law enforcement's activity in Caballes was permissible
while in Kyllo it was not. This logic has nothing to do with the place
being investigated, but rather with the technique of investigation.
143 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10.
144 Id. at 410.
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Justices Ginsburg and Souter dissented. 45 Both Justices pointed
out that the majority opinion would permit warrantless dog sniffs
of parked cars and pedestrians. 146 Justice Souter also argued that the
Court has provided no logical stopping point to the doctrine it an-
nounced. 47 Finally, both Justices noted that this case involved a
drug-sniffing dog, and the warrantless use of bomb dogs should be
treated differently.1
48
II. FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE HOME
Although the Court's contraband exception is worded broadly,
when it comes to warrantless canine sniffs, the contraband excep-
tion runs up against the most resolutely defended zone of Fourth
Amendment protection-the home. The Court has repeatedly de-
clared that protection of the home is at the core of the Fourth
Amendment. 149 In Silverman v. United States, the Court quotes with
approval Judge Jerome Frank, who described the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection of the home in the following way:
A man can still control a small part of his environment, his
house; he can retreat thence from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying
the Constitution. That is a sizable hunk of liberty worth
protecting from encroachment. A sane, decent, civilized so-
ciety must provide some such oasis, some shelter from pub-
145 Id. at 417-425 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 417, 422.
147 Id. at 417.
148 Id. at 417 n.7, 424-25.
149 See, e.g., Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 ("At the very core stands
the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion." (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029,
1066; Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-30 (1886))).
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lic scrutiny, some insulated enclosure, some enclave, some
inviolate place which is a man's castle. 5 0
Protecting the sanctity of the home is central to the Third and
Fourth Amendments. 151 Even in cases that do not involve the
Fourth Amendment, the Court has recognized that the home is a
unique redoubt of individual liberty. 1
52
With regard to the home, the Court's long-standing position has
been that a warrantless search of the interior of an individual's
home is per se unreasonable absent a clearly defined exception.
15 3
Although this rule is sometimes linked to United States v. Carroll,
154
its origins are arguably older. United States v. Boyd15 5 is the earliest
15 ld. at 511 n.4 (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir.
1951) (Frank, J., dissenting)).
151 But see Josh Dugan, Mhen Is a Search Not a Search? Mhen It's a Quarter: The Third
Amendment, Originalism, and NSA Wiretapping, 97 GEO. L. J. 555, 563 (2009). The au-
thor argues that quartering of soldiers was not limited to protecting the home. Id.
Rather it was meant to have a broader impact, removing soldiers from living among
citizens. Id.
152 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) ("Whatever may be the justifica-
tions for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into the pri-
vacy of one's own home."); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 495 (1965) (noting
that a "particularly important and sensitive area of privacy ... [is] the marital
home").
153 Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1864 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); United
States v. Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 191 (1990);
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573
(1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474 (1971).
'5 267 U.S. 132, 136, 162 (1925) (finding that when "officers were not anticipating
that the defendants would be coming through on the highway at that particular time,
but when they met them there they believed they were carrying liquor .... the
search, seizure, and arrest" was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment); see also
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 479, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2044 ("Carroll, on its
face, appears to be a classic example of the doctrine that warrantless searches are per
se unreasonable in the absence of exigent circumstances.").
155 116 U.S. 616, 638 (1886) (finding that the district judge's "notice to produce the
invoice in this case, the order by virtue of which it was issued, and the law which
authorized the order, were unconstitutional and void, and... [therefore] the inspec-
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declaration by the Supreme Court that the government generally
must secure a warrant before searching an individual's home.
56
Since Boyd this rule has been repeated again and again.'57 United
States v. Kyllo is one of the most recent and definitive reiterations of
this general rule. 58 The requirement that no search of a home be
conducted absent a warrant is so potent that even when exigencies
permit the warrantless entry of a home, law enforcement is limited
to "searches," which are demanded by the exigencies or are permit-
ted under the "plain view" doctrine. 159 This section will discuss
three cases that provide some sense of the Court's vigor with regard
to the warrant requirement in the home.
Boyd v. United States was the first case where the Supreme Court
attempted to define in detail how the Fourth Amendment should be
applied to the home.' 60 Since being decided, it has been cited by the
Supreme Court repeatedly for its explanation of the origins and
tion and . . . admission [of the invoice] in[tol evidence.., were erroneous and un-
constitutional").
156 See id. at 641 (Miller, J., concurring) ("Hence it is only unreasonable searches
and seizures that are forbidden, and the means of securing this protection was by
abolishing searches under warrants, which were called general warrants, because
they authorized searches in any place, for any thing .... [S]earches founded on affi-
davits, and made under warrants which described the thing to be searched for, the
person and place to be searched, are still permitted.").
157 See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text; infra notes 158-227 and accom-
panying text.
158 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 ("Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is
not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth
Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.").
159 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (finding that when exigent cir-
cumstances existed for police to enter an apartment, it was not a seizure to record
serial numbers off of a stolen turntable, but moving the equipment was "a 'search'
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was
the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment").
160 Although some might see Boyd as a case that only involves an individual's pa-
pers, the papers in that case were in Boyd's home. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.
S. 616, 618 (1886) (requiring Boyd "to produce the invoice of the 29 cases"). Also,
much of the Court's discussion in Boyd is directed toward the sanctity of the home.
Id. at 621-30.
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purpose of the Fourth Amendment.161 As recently as United States v.
Jones,' 62 the Court has used Boyd to illuminate the origins of the
Fourth Amendment. 1
63
The appellant in Boyd challenged the constitutionality of a fed-
eral forfeiture statute, claiming that the statute violated the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments. 164 Prior to trial the government moved to
compel the defendant to turn over certain business documents, ar-
guing it was entitled to the documents based on § 5 of the forfeiture
statute. 165 Section 5 of the statute authorized "the attorney repre-
senting the government, whenever in his belief any business book,
invoice, or paper belonging to, or under the control of, the defend-
ant or claimant, will tend to prove any allegation made by the Unit-
ed States, may make a written motion" requesting production of the
documents. 166 If the court granted the motion and the defendant
refused to produce the document, then "the allegation stated in the.
motion [would] be taken as confessed." 167 Although the discre-
161 See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) (citing Brower v. Coun-
ty of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626
(1886))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (" En tick v. Carrington (citation omitted) is
a case we have described as a monument of English freedom undoubtedly familiar to
every American statesman at the time the Constitution was adopted, and considered
to be the true and ultimate expression of constitutional law with regard to search and
seizure.").
162 See id. ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS device on a tar-
get's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, consti-
tutes a 'search.'").
163 See id. (citing Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U. S. 593, 596 (1989) (quoting Boyd
v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 626 (1886))) (internal quotation marks omitted) (" En-
tick v. Carrington (citation omitted) is a case we have described as a monument of
English freedom undoubtedly familiar to every American statesman at the time the
Constitution was adopted, and considered to be the true and ultimate expression of
constitutional law with regard to search and seizure.").
164 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 618, 621.
165 Id. at 619.
166 Id. at 619-20.
167 Id. at 620.
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tion to order production of the documents was left to the court, the
statute did not require the court to conduct a Fourth Amendment
analysis of whether to issue the order. 1
68
The Supreme Court held that the statute in Boyd implicated
both the Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution. 169 Re-
garding the Fourth Amendment, the Court began by dismissing the
argument that because the statute being challenged did not author-
ize searches or seizures, the Fourth Amendment was not implicat-
ed.170 The Court stated:
It is true that certain aggravating incidents of actual search
and seizure, such as forcible entry into a man's home and
searching amongst his papers, are wanting, . . .but [the
statute] accomplishes the substantial object of those acts in
forcing from a party evidence against himself .... It is our
opinion, therefore, that compulsory production of a man's
private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or
to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth
Amendment. 1
71
Next, the Court addressed whether the compulsory surrender
of the items in the cases was "an 'unreasonable search and seizure'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 72 To answer the
question whether the Fourth Amendment applied, the Court relied
168 Id. at 622 (finding that "a compulsory production of a man's private papers to
establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope
of the fourth amendment to the constitution, in all cases in which a search and sei-
zure would be, because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and
purpose of search and seizure").
169 See id. at 632 ("[T]he law, though very speciously worded, is still obnoxious to
the prohibition of the fourth amendment of the constitution, as well as of the fifth.").
170 Id. at 622-32. The Government argued that the statute in question did not in-
volve a search of the Appellant's home, rather it merely required production of
items. Id. at 622.
171 Id. at 622.
172 Id.
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heavily on American and British history prior to the American Rev-
olution. 173 The Court focused particular attention on the British case
of Entick v. Carrington and Three Other King's Messengers.'74 Accord-
ing to the Court, Lord Camden's opinion in Entick should be ap-
plied in the current case because it is "sufficiently explanatory of
what was meant by unreasonable searches and seizures" at the time
of the framing of the Constitution.'
7 5
The Entick case dealt with the practice in England of the Secre-
tary of State issuing general warrants to search private homes.
176
Such warrants were usually issued in order to find and seize books
and papers to be used in criminal prosecutions for libel committed
against public officials. 177 After one such case, the individual against
whom the general warrant was issued, John Wilkes, brought a tres-
pass suit against the individuals who executed the general war-
rant.'7 8 The individuals who executed the general warrant claimed
the action for trespass should be dismissed because they had the
authority to enter Wilkes's home based on the general warrant.
79
17 Id. at 622-32.
174 Id. at 626-32. Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765) (finding
that "the warrant to seize and carry away the party's papers in the case of a seditious
libel is illegal and void").
175 Boyd, 116 U.S. at 627.
176 See id. at 626 ("The action was trespass for entering the plaintiff's dwelling-
house in November, 1762, and breaking open his desks, boxes, etc., and searching
and examining his papers." (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029
(1765))).
177 See id. at 625-26 ("Prominent and principal among these was the practice of is-
suing general warrants by the secretary of state, for searching private houses for the
discovery and seizure of books and papers that might be used to convict their owner
of the charge of libel.").
178 See id. at 626 ("The action was trespass for entering the plaintiff's dwelling-
house in November, 1762, and breaking open his desks, boxes, etc., and searching
and examining his papers." (citing Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029
(1765))).
17 Id. at 625-26.
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The court considered the lawfulness of this justification and found
it insufficient.180 Lord Camden wrote in his opinion that "[tihe great
end for which men entered into society was to secure their proper-
ty," and absent "some public law for the good of the whole," prop-
erty rights are "sacred and incommunicable." 181 Lord Camden went
on to write that laws that claim to give magistrates the authority to
issue general warrants are "too much for us ... to pronounce a
practice legal which would be subversive of all the comforts of soci-
ety." 1
82
In applying the essence of the Entick opinion, the Supreme
Court held that § 5 of the statute under consideration would have
never been approved by the First Congress.8 3 The Court explained,
The struggle against arbitrary power in which [the mem-
bers of the First Congress] had been engaged for more than
twenty years, would have been too deeply engraved in
their memories to have allowed them to approve of such in-
sidious disguises of the old grievance which they had so
deeply abhorred.'8
Thus, based on a violation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, the
Court declared § 5 of the statute unconstitutional and overturned
the case.
185
Although the Court in Boyd analyzed the language of the
Fourth Amendment, that was only the starting point of the opinion.
The Court looked beyond the literal language of the Fourth
Amendment and made broad statements about the values the
180 See id. at 629 ("' [We are all of opinion that the warrant to seize and carry away
the party's papers in the case of a seditious libel is illegal and void."' (quoting Entick
v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765))).
181 Id. at 627 (quoting Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howell's State Trials 1029 (1765)).
182 Id. at 628.
183 Id. at 630.
184 Id.
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Fourth Amendment was supposed to protect. Prophetically, Justice
Bradley wrote:
The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very es-
sence of constitutional liberty and security. They reach far-
ther than the concrete form of the case then before the
court.... [T]hey apply to all invasions on the part of the
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's
home and the privacies of life.
186
The second case that is particularly significant to the warrant
requirement in the home is Payton v. New York.' 7 Although the facts
of Payton deal with a seizure rather than a search, the case consoli-
dates the Court's position on searches of the home.'88 The Payton
Court folds into its discussion of the Fourth Amendment several
critical cases.'89 This discussion leads the Court to the conclusion
that "it is a 'basic principle of Fourth Amendment law' that searches
and seizures inside a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable."' 
90
In Payton the Court considered two cases that involved a New
York statute that authorized police to enter an individual's home to
18- Id. at 638.
186 Id. at 630.
181445 U.S. 573, 576 (1980) (holding "that the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a sus-
pect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest" (internal citations omitted)).
188 Id.
189 Id. at 574-90 (citing G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338 (1977);
United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976); United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); Beck v. Ohio, 379
U.S. 89 (1964); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1948); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616 (1886)).
191 Id. at 586.
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make an arrest without a warrant. 19' In both cases police entered the
defendants' homes based on probable cause but without a war-
rant. 92 In one case police found narcotics in plain view while arrest-
ing the defendant, 93 and in the other case police found an incrimi-
nating shell casing.194 The New York Court of Appeals found the
arrests lawful and the evidence admissible.' 95 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari and reversed. 196
The Court began its analysis by noting that exigencies did not
exist that would have justified the warrantless entry of the defend-
ant's homes in either of the cases it was reviewing.' 97 Next, the
Court discussed the familiar history of the Fourth Amendment and
its purpose as a check on the arbitrary power.'98 The Court quoted
extensively from Johnson v. United States where Justice Jackson "co-
gently observed":
The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is...
a grave concern, not only to the individual but to society
which chooses to dwell in a reasonable security and free-
dom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must rea-
sonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decid-
ed by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government
enforcement agent.199
191 Id. at 573.
192 Id.
193 See id. at 578 ("Before permitting him to dress, they opened a chest of drawers
two feet from the bed in search of weapons and found narcotics and related para-
phernalia.").
194 See id. at 576-77 ("In plain view ... was a .30-caliber shell casing that was seized
and later admitted into evidence at Payton's murder trial.").
195 Id. at 579.
196 Id. at 602.
197 Id. at 583.
198 Id. at 583-600.
199 Id. at 586 n.24 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)).
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The Court concluded by rejecting an argument that searches
and seizures in the home should be treated differently. 200 The ma-
jority wrote:
[A]ny differences in the intrusiveness of entries to search
and entries to arrest are merely ones of degree rather than
kind. The two intrusions share this fundamental character-
istic: the breach of the entrance to an individual's home....
In terms that apply equally to seizures of property and sei-
zures of persons, the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm
line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circum-
stances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed with-
out a warrant.0
The Court in Payton noted that absent consent there is one ex-
ception to the warrant requirement - exigent circumstances. 202
However, even when exigent circumstances exist, law enforcement
is limited by the plain view doctrine.0 3 This limitation is illustrated
in Arizona v. Hicks.0 Hicks is particularly significant to a discussion
of the contraband exception because the item central to the case was
200 Id. at 588-89.
201 Id. at 589-90.
202 See id. at 588-89 ("To be arrested in the home involves not only the invasion at-
tendant to all arrests, but also an invasion of the sanctity of the home, which is too
substantial an invasion to allow without a warrant, in the absence of exigent circum-
stances, even when it is accomplished under statutory authority and when probable
cause is present.").
203 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324 (1987) (finding that when exigent cir-
cumstances existed for police to enter an apartment, it was not a seizure to record
serial numbers off of a stolen turntable, but moving the equipment was "a 'search'
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was
the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment").
204 Id.
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a piece of stolen property. 20 5 This is important because it would
seem reasonable to conclude society would be no more willing to
recognize Hick's expectation of privacy in stolen goods than it
would in illegal drugs.
In Hicks, police entered the defendant's apartment after a bullet
was fired through its floor, injuring a man in the apartment be-
low. 206 Police entered to search for the shooter and other possible
victims. 207 Once inside, the police found several guns and expensive
stereo equipment.2 8 Suspecting the equipment was stolen, one of
the officers moved some of the equipment in order to record the
serial numbers. 2 9 Based on the serial numbers the officer deter-
mined that the stereo equipment had in fact been stolen.21 0 At trial
the defendant moved to suppress the stereo equipment claiming the
police had conducted a warrantless search. 21 ' The trial court's deci-
sion to grant the motion was upheld by the Arizona court of ap-
peals.212 The matter was ultimately appealed to the Supreme Court
and was affirmed.213
205 Id. at 323-324. See also Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378 (1993) (compar-
ing the facts to Hicks and noting that "[o]nce again, the analogy to the plain-view
doctrine is apt"). The court states that this case is like Hicks because the "incriminat-
ing character of the object was not immediately apparent to" the officer. Id. at 379.
"Rather, the officer determined that the item was contraband only after conducting a
further search, one not authorized by Terry or by any other exception to the warrant
requirement." Id. The court goes on to again rely on Hicks stating: "If, however, the
police lack probable cause to believe that an object in plain view is contraband with-
out conducting some further search of the object - i.e., if 'its incriminating character
[is not] 'immediately apparent,' the plain-view doctrine cannot justify its seizure." Id.
at 375 (internal citations omitted).





211 Id. at 324.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 329.
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The Court began its discussion of the case by agreeing with the
government that the officer's act of moving the stereo equipment
was not a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.1 4
The Court reasoned that merely moving the equipment "did not
'meaningfully interfere' with the respondent's possessory inter-
est." 215 The Court also noted that simply "inspecting those parts of
the turntable that came into view during [the search justified by the
exigent circumstances] would not have constituted an independent
search."21 6 However, the majority held that when the officer moved
the turntable he did expose "to view concealed portions of the
apartment... [and] produce[d] a new invasion of respondent's in-
terest unjustified by the exigent circumstances that validated the
entry."21 7 In response to Justice Powell's dissent, the majority noted
that there was a significant difference between looking and mov-
ing-concluding that "[a] search is a search, even if it happens to
disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable." 21 8 Finally, the ma-
jority rejected Justice O'Connor's invitation to permit police to con-
duct "a cursory inspection of a suspicious item in plain view in or-
der to determipe whether it is indeed evidence of a crime." 219 Justice
O'Connor argued such a reasonable suspicion inspection should be
permitted because it is minimally intrusive and serves important
governmental interests.220 In support of this argument, she cited
United States v. Place and noted that the intrusion in Place was more
significant than that in Hicks.22'
214 Id. at 324.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 325.
217 Id.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 328-29; id.at 335 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 338 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
221 Id.
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Although Hicks was primarily about keeping the exigent cir-
cumstances exception to the warrant requirement in check, it is
nonetheless potentially relevant to the contraband exception.222 At
the heart of the contraband exception is the conclusion that the use
of a test that reveals nothing more than the presence or absence of
an item in which a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy
does not constitute an impermissible search.223 The officer's actions
in Hicks, arguably, did nothing more than reveal that the turntable
in Hicks's apartment was stolen. If the Court's conclusions in Place
and Jacobsen were intended to apply in all contexts, then why not in
the Hicks case?
Boyd, Payton, and Kyllo all reinforce the continuing significance
of Pitt's 1763 declaration. 224 With few exceptions, warrantless
searches of the home presumptively violate the Fourth Amend-
ment.225 These cases make it clear that there is more than just priva-
cy at stake with regard to the home. Each of the cases use terms like
"sanctity," "security," and "liberty" to describe the interests at stake
in the home.226 These interests seem to come into play in Kyllo and
m2 But see Richard P. Salgado, Fourth Amendment Search and the Power of the Hash,
119 HARV. L. REV. F. 38, 42 (2005) (noting that "[alt first glance, the facts in Hicks may
seem analogous to a hash calculation[,] ... [blut those similarities are superficial").
Hashing is a powerful and pervasive technique used in nearly every exam-
ination of seized digital media. The concept behind hashing is quite ele-
gant: take a large amount of data, such as a file or all the bits on a hard
drive, and use a complex mathematical algorithm to generate a relatively
compact numerical identifier (the hash value) unique to that data.
Id. at 38.
m See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy, and a dog "sniff discloses
only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item").
224 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
m See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980) ("It is a 'basic principle of
Fourth Amendment law' that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant
are presumptively unreasonable." (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S.
443,477 (1971))).
226 See id. at 589 (noting that to be arrested in the home is "an invasion of the sancti-
ty of the home"); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting that "it is the
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Hicks where efforts to permit arguably minimally intrusive non-
searches have been rejected.22 7
III. UNITED STATES V. JONES: A NEW WAY FORWARD?
In addition to the cases discussed above, the impact of United
States v. Jones22 must be considered. Jones was one of the most antic-
ipated Supreme Court decisions of 2012. The opinion did not dis-
appoint. In what some saw as an unanticipated result, the Court
unanimously determined that affixing a credit-card-sized tracking
device on the exterior of a suspect's car without a warrant was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment.2 29 Not only were many sur-
prised by the 9-0 holding, but some were also surprised by the ma-
jority's apparent partial resurrection of the trespass doctrine in
Fourth Amendment law.23 °
In Jones, police suspected the respondent of drug trafficking.
2 3
1
As part of a joint investigation with the FBI, police sought a search
warrant that would permit them to affix a GPS tracking device to
invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty, and private
property" at stake).
227 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (holding that when "the Government
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a Fourth Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable with-
out a warrant"); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321,324 (1987) (finding that when exigent
circumstances existed for police to enter an apartment, it was not a seizure to record
serial numbers off of a stolen turntable, but moving the equipment was "a 'search'
separate and apart from the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was
the lawful objective of his entry into the apartment").
22m See 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GPS
device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's move-
ments, constitutes a 'search."').
229 Id.
230 See generally id. at 952 ("[Tlhe Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has
been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
231 Id. at 948.
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Jones's car.232 A warrant was issued authorizing police to affix the
device within ten days, but police did not place the GPS device on
Jones's car until the eleventh day.233 Police then tracked Jones's
movements over the next twenty-eight days, and the government
used the information secured from the GPS in charging Jones with
conspiracy to distribute cocaine.3 The trial court granted in part
Jones's motion to suppress the information, suppressing only the
information gathered by the GPS device while Jones's car was
parked in the garage next to his house.235 Ultimately, Jones was
convicted, and the trial court's ruling on the motion was appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia.236 The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the evidence ob-
tained by warrantless use of the GPS device should have been ex-
cluded.237 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed.238
Although the Court's decision to affirm the D.C. Circuit was
unanimous, the justices did not agree on a rationale. The central
disagreement within the Court was over the role the government's
physical trespass should play in the Fourth Amendment analysis.
Justices Scalia and Sotomayor concluded that the physical trespass
committed by the government on Jones's car was enough, on its





236 Id. at 949.
237 Id.
23 Id.
239 See id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion because I
agree that a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment occurs, at a mini-
mum, '[wihere, as here, the Government obtains information by physically intruding
on a constitutionally protected area .... The Government usurped Jones' property
for the purpose of conducting surveillance on him, thereby invading privacy inter-
ests long afforded, and undoubtedly entitled to, Fourth Amendment protection.")
(alteration in original) (citation omitted).
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ia and Sotomayor stated that had there been no physical trespass,
then the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test would have
to be applied to the facts.240 Justice Alito argued that relying on the
government's physical trespass as the basis for finding a Fourth
Amendment violation "is unwise." 241 Rather, Justice Alito argued
that the Katz test should be applied in the first place, instead of as a
fallback to a trespass analysis.242
Justices Scalia and Sotomayor suggested a modification in the
Court's current method of analyzing the Fourth Amendment. Ac-
cording to both, a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment occurs "where, as here, the Government obtains in-
formation by physically intruding on a constitutionally protected
area." 243 Further, both agreed that in the absence of a physical tres-
pass the Court should apply the Katz "reasonable expectation of
privacy" test.244 Central to Justice Scalia's argument is the belief that
the Fourth Amendment "is to be construed in light of what was
deemed to be an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted." 24' This statement was first written in a Supreme Court
decision in 1925.246 Since joining the Court, Justice Scalia has re-
ferred to it several times.247 Based on this core idea, Justice Scalia
240 See id. at 950, 955
241 Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
242 See id. at 964 ("The best that we can do in this case is to apply existing Fourth
Amendment doctrine and to ask whether the use of GPS tracking in a particular case
involved a degree of intrusion that a reasonable person would not have anticipat-
ed.").
243 Id. at 950 n.3. See also id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
244 See id. at 952 (" [T]he Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added
to, but not substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.").
245 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
246 Id.
247 See, e.g., Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40
(2001); Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299 (1999); Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508
U.S. 366, 379 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 583-
84 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991).
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concluded reference to the Katz test was unnecessary. 248 According
to Justice Scalia, when the government physically occupies private
property for the purpose of obtaining information, "such a physical
intrusion would have been considered a 'search' within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted."249
Application of a trespass theory as a first line of Fourth
Amendment defense could place a limit on some applications of the
contraband exception. For example, in Jacobsen the government
agents opened the defendant's Federal Express package, removed a
portion of the contents and tested it, potentially committing a tres-
pass.2 50 Other potential applications of the contraband exception
involving technologies that emit a ray or wave that makes contact
with the property of a suspect may be off-limits as well. In at least
one case, the government has in fact attempted to expand the appli-
cation of the contraband exception to the search of a computer for
digital contraband.2 5 1 Although the Court never resolved the issue,
Jones may make such warrantless searches forbidden. These poten-
tial impacts are speculative. As Justice Alito points out in his con-
currence, not all states have agreed that "transmission of electrons
that occurs when a communication is sent from one computer to
another is enough" to constitute a trespass. 252 These impacts rely on
Justice Sotomayor remaining shoulder-to-shoulder with Justices
Thomas, Kennedy, Roberts, and Scalia on the issue. Although Jus-
tice Sotomayor joined Justice Scalia's majority opinion in full, her
248 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
249 Id. at 949.
250 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1984).
251 United States v. Crist, 627 F. Supp. 2d 575, 581-82 (M.D. Pa. 2008). Additionally,
Robyn Burrows argues that at least one other case has paved the way for warrantless
hashing. Robyn Burrows, Judicial Confusion and the Digital Drug Dog Sniff. Pragmatic
Solutions Permitting Warrantless Hashing of Known Illegal Files, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
255 (2011).
252 Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Cyber
Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bez-
enek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 n.6 (1996)).
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concurrence straddled the line between Justice Scalia's opinion and
Justice Alito's. Justice Sotomayor's concurrence seems to say, "I see
both your points of view," yet her concurrence actually goes further
than either of the other opinions in suggesting a modification (if not
wholesale rejection) of the third-party exception as it relates to
technology.
253
If the Court finds that the police presence on Jardines's porch is
lawful, the Court is left with applying the Katz test. Historically,
courts that have applied the Katz test to warrantless dog sniffs of
the home have concluded that the defendant had no reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy.25 4 Owing to statements made by the Supreme
253 Justice Sotomayor writes:
More fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information volun-
tarily disclosed to third parties.... I would not assume that all information
voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose
is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
25 See State v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d 1054, 1056 (1990) ("In light of the rationale adopt-
ed by the Supreme Court in Place, and reaffirmed in Jacobsen, we reject defendant's
contention that his Federal constitutional rights were violated."). Because the canine
sniff was "conducted outside his apartment [and] could reveal only the presence or
absence of illicit drugs, it did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. See also United States v. Tarazon-Silva, 960 F. Supp. 1152,
1163 (W.D. Tex. 1997) (finding that the officer and canine "were positioned in an area
where they lawfully had a right to be ... [therefore the dog's] sniff and subsequent
alert to the scent of narcotics emanating from the dryer vent did not constitute a
search"). Before 1997, courts ruled that dog sniffs were permissible for Amtrak
sleeper cars. United States v. Coyler, 278 U.S. App. D.C. 367, 474-77 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
Courts also ruled dog sniffs permissible outside motel rooms and homes where the
dog was lawfully present because it was not a search. United States v. Reed, 141 F.3d
644 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Marlar, 828 F. Supp. 415, 419 (N.D. Miss. 1993);
but see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Here the defend-
ant had a legitimate expectation that the contents of his closed apartment would
remain private, that they could not be 'sensed' from outside his door [and the] [u]se
of the trained dog impermissibly intruded on that legitimate expectation."); United
States v. Jackson, No. IP 03-79-CR-1 H/F, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15676, at *16 (S.D.
Ind. Feb. 4, 2004) ("Because the issuance of the search warrant depended on infor-
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Court in Place and Jacobsen, most state and federal courts have ruled
dog sniffs of the home are not searches within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.2 5 Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Caballes,
this mostly one-sided line of cases became almost entirely one-
sided.256 The only holdout courts have been from Florida.257 Be-
tween the Supreme Court's decision in Caballes in 2005 and the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's Jardines decision in 2011, only one other appel-
late court had declared warrantless dog sniffs of the home violated
the Fourth Amendment.258
mation the police had gathered by [using a drug-sniffing dog around the home,
which] violat[ed] the Fourth Amendment, the search warrant was invalid and the
evidence obtained from the February 17, 2002 search must be suppressed.").
255 See, e.g., Reed, 141 F.3d at 649; Tarazon-Silva, 960 F. Supp. at 1163; Marlar, 828 F.
Supp. at 419; Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1056.
256 See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 417 F.3d 692 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Scott, No. 3:08-cr-00057-JAJ, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9895 (S.D. Iowa Jan. 28, 2009);
United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Colo. 2008); State v. Jardines, 9
So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2008); Hoop v. State, 909 N.E.2d 463 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); People v. Jones, 755
N.W.2d 224 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008); State v. Cook, Nos. 2010-CA-40 & 2010-CA-41,
2011 WL 1376622 (Ohio Ct. App. 2011); but see State v. Rabb, 920 So. 2d 1175, 1184-85
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006).
257 See, e.g., Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 36 (Fla. 2011) ("Accordingly, we conclude
that a 'sniff test,' such as the test that was conducted in the present case, is a substan-
tial government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and constitutes a 'search'
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. As such, it must be preceded by an
evidentiary showing of wrongdoing."), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No.
11-564). Some courts have chosen not to rule on the matter. For example, the Arizona
Supreme Court in State v. Guillen chose to avoid the issue, ruling the suspect gave
consent. See 223 P.3d 658, 662 (Ariz. 2010) (en banc) ("Assuming, without deciding,
that the dog sniff violated Article 2, Section 8, we conclude that Mrs. Guillen's con-
sent was valid because under Brown's three-factor test, intervening circumstances
obviated any alleged taint and the first dog sniff conducted from outside the garage
was not flagrant police misconduct.").
2-8 See Rabb, 920 So. 2d at 1185 (holding that "the dog sniff of Rabb's house [was]
violative of the Fourth Amendment").
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IV. FLORIDA V. JARDINES AND THE MEANING OF INTRUSIVENESS.
Jardines is the first state supreme court case, post-Caballes,25 9 to
declare that the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless dog
sniffs of the home.260 The Jardines court concluded that the intru-
siveness, embarrassment, fear, and humiliation caused by police
walking a dog up to a person's front door were too much.2 6' The
analysis used by the Jardines court is unique, putting a new spin on
earlier contraband exception cases. Rather than concluding that
Kyllo overruled Caballes, the Florida court held that one of the hall-
marks of the contraband exception, minimal intrusiveness, was vio-
lated in this case.262
A. THE BACKGROUND
The investigation of Jardines began with an unverified tip to a
crime-stoppers hotline that Jardines was growing marijuana in his
home.263 Approximately a month later, Detective Pedraja with the
Miami-Dade County Police Department went to Jardines's home at
7:00 a.m. 264 The detective observed that the window blinds were
closed, there was no car in the driveway, and the air conditioner
259 In State v. Ortiz, 257 Neb. 784, 600 N.W.2d 805 (1999), the Nebraska Supreme
Court held a dog sniff at the front door of the defendant's apartment violated the
Fourth Amendment.
260 See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 55-56 (Fla. 2011) (holding "that the warrant-
less 'sniff test' that was conducted at the front door of the residence in the present
case was an unreasonable government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and
violated the Fourth Amendment"), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-
564).
261 Id. at 48-49.
262 See id. at 45 ("Significantly, all the sniff and field tests in the above cases were
conducted in a minimally intrusive manner upon objects -luggage at an airport in
Place, vehicles on the roadside in Edmond and Caballes, and a package in transit in
Jacobsen -that warrant no special protection under the Fourth Amendment.").
263 Id. at 37.
264 Id.
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was running constantly. 265 Fifteen minutes later, an officer arrived
with a narcotics dog named Franky.266 The officer let Franky out of
the car, placed him on a leash, and accompanied the dog to the
front porch of Jardines's home.2 67 According to the officer's testi-
mony at a suppression hearing, Franky began alerting to the pres-
ence of narcotics the moment he entered the porch. 268 Franky
walked to the front door of the home and sat, signaling to his han-
dler that he had found the source of the narcotic smell. The officer
then left the porch and informed Detective Pedraja that Franky had
alerted to the presence of drugs. 269 Detective Pedraja then ap-
proached the door of the Jardines home to request consent to search
the house.270 While at the front door, Detective Pedraja detected the
smell of live marijuana.271 This information, along with the infor-
mation about the air conditioner and the anonymous tip, was in-
cluded in an affidavit submitted in support of a request for a war-
rant to search Jardines's home.272 Based on the affidavit a search
warrant was issued and a search revealed live marijuana plants and
a hydroponics lab for growing marijuana.273 Jardines was charged
with trafficking in cannabis and grand larceny.274 At a suppression
hearing, Jardines argued the warrantless use of Franky to sniff at
the front porch and door of his home violated the Fourth Amend-
ment.275 The trial court agreed and suppressed the evidence ob-














274 Id. at 62 (Polston, J., dissenting).
275 Id. at 38.
2761d.
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The State appealed the judge's ruling, and Florida's Third Dis-
trict Court reversed the trial judge- concluding the warrantless
sniff was not a search.27 7 The Third District Court of Florida was the
third intermediate Florida appellate court to answer whether a war-
rantless dog sniff was a search.278 Two of the district courts held it
was not, and one found that it was. 2 79 Thus, the Florida Supreme
Court had to resolve a split among the Florida appellate courts. A
majority of the Florida Supreme Court reversed the Third District
Court and held that a search had occurred.28 0
B. FLORIDA SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
The Florida Supreme Court reviewed all the major contraband
exception cases: Place, Edmond, Caballes, Jacobsen and Kyllo.25' After
reviewing these cases, the court found "the analysis used in the
above federal 'dog sniff' cases [] inapplicable to a 'sniff test' con-
ducted at a private home." 212 The Jardines court based this conclu-
sion on the fact that "all the sniff and field tests in the above cases
were conducted in a minimally intrusive manner upon objects . . .
that warrant no special protection under the Fourth Amend-
277 Id.
278 See Stabler v. State, 990 So. 2d 1258, 1263 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (concluding
"that the dog sniff at the front door of the apartment did not constitute a Fourth
Amendment search because it did not violate a legitimate privacy interest"); Nelson
v. State, 867 So. 2d 534, 537 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (holding "that a trained dog's
detection of odor in a common corridor does not contravene the Fourth Amend-
ment").
279 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 55-56 (holding "that the warrantless 'sniff test' that was
conducted at the front door of the residence in the present case was an unreasonable
government intrusion into the sanctity of the home and violated the Fourth Amend-
ment"); Stabler, 990 So. 2d at 1263; Nelson, 867 So. 2d at 537.
280 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 55-56.
281 Id. at 42-44.
282 Id. at 44.
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ment."283 The court went on to observe that in Place, Jacobsen, Ed-
mond, and Caballes, "the tests were conducted in an impersonal
manner that subjected the defendants to no untoward level of pub-
lic opprobrium, humiliation, or embarrassment." 28 4 Additionally,
according to the court, "under the particular circumstances of each
of the above cases the tests were not susceptible to being employed
in a discriminatory or arbitrary manner .... ,,2 5 The court summed
up its conclusion by stating:
[A] "sniff test" by a drug detection dog at a private resi-
dence does not only reveal the presence of contraband ...
but it also constitutes an intrusive procedure that may ex-
pose the resident to public opprobrium, humiliation, or
embarrassment, and it raises the specter of arbitrary or dis-
criminatory application.286
Thus, the Florida Supreme Court appeared to root its holding in
at least three bases: First, under the facts of Jardines, the dog sniff
was conducted in an intrusive fashion that exposed the residents of
the home to public scorn, humiliation, and fear that could cause a
"reflexive or unpredictable response." 287 Second, the home, unlike
an automobile, luggage, or mail, is entitled to "special protec-
tion." 288 Finally, the investigative technique in Jardines, unlike Place,
Jacobsen, Edmond, or Caballes was susceptible to arbitrary applica-
tion.289
One of the challenges of determining how the Supreme Court
will react to the Jardines opinion is the fashion in which the Florida
283 Id. at 46.
284 Id. at 45.
285 Id. at 46.
286 Id. at 49.
2s7 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 49.
2m Id. at 45-46.
289 Id. at 49.
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court applied the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test. In
each of the Supreme Court's contraband exception cases, the Court
applied the Katz two-prong test, asking whether the defendant had
a subjective expectation of privacy and whether that was an expec-
tation society was willing to recognize as legitimate.
290 In each of
those cases the Court found the defendants had a subjective expec-
tation of privacy but not one society was willing to recognize as
legitimate. In Jardines, the Florida court seems to side step applica-
tion of the Katz analysis. To be sure, the court cites Katz several
times but instead of asking whether Jardines has a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in contraband, the court catalogs criticisms of the
dog sniff as it was conducted in the case and factual distinctions
between the Jardines sniff and other contraband exception cases.
9
However, the opinion is unclear as to how these criticisms and dis-
tinctions relate to one another. The court does not explain whether
it is citing multiple independent bases for finding the dog sniff was
a search or if the dog sniff became a search under a kind of totality
of the circumstances test. Despite this shortcoming, the Jardines
court does zero in on an aspect of the contraband exception im-
portant to its application, minimal intrusiveness.292 In all but Jacob-
290 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that "[a] dog sniff con-
ducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment"); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000)
(finding that "[tihe fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exte-
rior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a
search"); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) ("A chemical test that
merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine does not compro-
mise any legitimate interest in privacy."); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707
(1983) (sniffing by a "trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment").
291 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 40-44.
mSee id. at 45.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
The Wolf at the Castle Door
sen, the fact that the investigative technique was minimally intru-
sive was an important factor in the application of the exception.293
1. Intrusiveness
The Jardines court focused considerable attention on this aspect
of the dog sniff. In the course of concluding that the dog sniff of
Jardines's home "was an intrusive procedure" the court discussed
several aspects of the sniff.2 94 The court concluded that "the 'sniff
test' was a sophisticated undertaking that involved state and federal
agencies, numerous agents and vehicles, and hours of police in-
volvement.295 Further, the court noted that "there was no anonymi-
ty for the resident."296 The court described the events as "a public
spectacle" that was conducted on a residential street and would
"invariably entail a degree of public opprobrium, humiliation, and
embarrassment." 297 It appears that these factors-the number of
police and agencies involved, the time police were present at or
near Jardines's home, and the public spectacle coupled with the ab-
sence of anonymity - led the court to find the dog sniff intrusive.
This analysis presents at least three difficulties. First, the court's
conclusion that the dog sniff in this case created a public spectacle
seems to be an overstatement. Second, adopting a test that punishes
police for creating a public spectacle invites police to simply be
more covert. Finally, the court's interpretation of intrusiveness in
293 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 ("Any intrusion on respondent's privacy expecta-
tions does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable infringement."); Ed-
mond, 531 U.S. at 53 (noting that stops "executed in a regularized and neutral manner
... only minimally intrude upon the privacy of the motorists... [and] should there-
fore be constitutional"); Place, 462 U.S. at 703 ("When the nature and extent of the
detention are minimally intrusive of the individual's Fourth Amendment interests,
the opposing law enforcement interests can support a seizure based on less than
probable cause.").
294 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 36.
295 Id. at 36, 48.
296 Id.
297 Id.
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the context of the contraband exception is different from that of the
Supreme Court.298
The Jardines court painted an ominous picture of the dog sniff in
this case. The court noted there were state and federal agencies in-
volved, several police vehicles, and it took several hours from dog
sniff to search, with law enforcement keeping surveillance on
Jardines's home all the while.299 These facts led the court to find that
the manner in which the dog sniff was conducted was "a public
spectacle."300 What is not clear from the facts is how many of the
police vehicles were marked or unmarked, how many officers were
in uniform, or how close the additional officers were to Jardines's
house. The court concluded this particular dog sniff created a public
spectacle, and yet Jardines himself was apparently unaware of the
spectacle occurring right outside his front door. When police ar-
rived to execute the search warrant approximately an hour and a
half after the dog sniff, Jardines attempted to flee the house through
the back door.0 The court noted that from start to finish the events
at the defendant's home "lasted for hours."30 2 However, the dog
sniff took place 15 minutes after the first officer arrived on the sce-
ne.30 3 The dog sniff itself seems to have been very brief. The narcot-
ics dog Franky began signaling that narcotics were present as he
was being walked up the porch of the home. 304 The court's use of
events that occurred after Franky had come and gone from the sce-
ne to determine if the sniff was a search seems untenable. Either the
dog sniff was a search or not a search when it occurred. It does not
298 See infra notes 305-18 and accompanying text.




M Id. at 37.
3N' Id.
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seem logical to say a dog sniff becomes a search if too many police
remain too long after the sniff was conducted.
Another problem with the court's public spectacle test is that it
invites police to simply be more subtle. Instead of several officers in
uniform and marked police vehicles, law enforcement could use an
undercover officer with a dog and unmarked cars. Thus, the public
and potentially the suspect would be entirely unaware of the dog
sniff. By using the Jardines court's analysis, such measures could
cause the dog sniff to no longer be categorized as a search. This re-
sult seems unsatisfactory. In some ways the Jardines court may in-
advertently be trading one harm for another. A very public dog
sniff may be embarrassing, but if police are required to do covert
dog sniffs the public is left to wonder if every stranger with a dog is
actually conducting a search.
The third difficulty in the court's intrusiveness analysis is that
the court's use of the word appears inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's. Although the word intrusive is capable of various defini-
tions, in the context of the contraband exception it seems to have a
specific meaning.05 In Place, Edmond, and Caballes, intrusive means
exposure to public view or actual physical entry. 30 6 Of the contra-
band exception cases, the Place court gives the clearest indication of
what is meant when the Court describes dog sniffs as minimally
intrusive. In Place, the Court notes that the dog sniff "does not re-
305 See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
306 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005) (noting that noncontraband
items are not exposed to public view, and there "[a]ny intrusion on respondent's
privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a constitutionally cognizable in-
fringement"); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000) (noting that
stops "executed in a regularized and neutral manner ... only minimally intrude
upon the privacy of the motorists ... [and] should therefore be constitutional");
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (noting that the "limited disclosure [by
a dog sniff].. . ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embar-
rassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investi-
gative methods").
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quire opening the luggage[,]" 30 7and "it does not expose noncontra-
band items that otherwise would remain hidden from public
view." 30 8 The Edmond Court's discussion supports this conclusion.
30 9
In Edmond, the Court held the dog sniff of a vehicle was less intru-
sive because it "does not require entry into the car and is not de-
signed to disclose any information other than the presence or ab-
sence of narcotics." 31 0 Finally, the Caballes Court merely quotes
Place, noting dog sniffs are unique because they do "not expose
noncontraband items that otherwise would remain hidden from
public view."
311
The Jardines court argued that the dog sniff in that case was in-
trusive because it was a public spectacle, the defendant was ex-
posed to public humiliation, and the sniff of his residence lacked
anonymity.312 Although some of the Supreme Court's discussion of
intrusiveness deals with public embarrassment, it is not the public
embarrassment that creates the intrusiveness. Rather, the Court in
Place makes clear that dog sniffs do not expose otherwise private
information to public view and thereby reduce public embarrass-
ment.313 Thus, it is the minimally intrusive nature of the dog sniff
that reduces the public embarrassment, not the reduction of embar-
rassment that creates minimal intrusiveness. 314
301 Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
3w Id.
30 See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (holding that a dog sniff of a vehicle was less intru-
sive because it "does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose
any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics").
310 Id.
311 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409 (quoting Place, 462 U.S. at 707).
312 See supra notes 295-97 and accompanying text.
313 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that the "limited disclosure [by a dog sniff] ...
ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative meth-
ods").
314 Id.
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Further, the Jardines court concludes that walking a dog up to a
person's home automatically creates public humiliation and oppro-
brium.3t5 Some may argue this conclusion is suspect. Assuming,
arguendo, there is nothing humiliating about an officer walking up
to a person's front door, why then is an officer with a dog a public
spectacle? If the Supreme Court had the same view as the Jardines
court would not the Caballes dog sniff also be a search? In Caballes,
the suspect's car was pulled over on a public highway, and a nar-
cotics dog was permitted to walk around and sniff the car.3t 6 Argu-
ably Caballes was placed in a more embarrassing position. Unlike
Jardines, Caballes had been detained by police.3 17 Jardines's neigh-
bors could have concluded the officer with Franky was part of a law
enforcement outreach program, or was present for some benign
reason. In Caballes that conclusion was not possible. Arguably, a
dog sniffing around a car pulled over on a highway could seem
more damning then a dog sniffing as it is being walked up to a front
door.
The Jardines court was in a difficult position. It was bound to in-
terpret the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution's corol-
lary, consistent with the precedent laid down by the United States
Supreme Court. Minimal intrusiveness is one aspect of dog sniffs
that the Supreme Court has relied upon to conclude the practice is
not a search.318 It appears the Florida court attempted to work with-
315 Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 36 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6,
2012) (No. 11-564).
316 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406.
317 
Id.
318 See Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (noting that the "limited disclosure [by a dog sniff....
ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected to the embarrassment and
inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive investigative meth-
ods"); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53 (2000) (noting that stops "exe-
cuted in a regularized and neutral manner... only minimally intrude upon the pri-
vacy of the motorists... [and] should therefore be constitutional"); Caballes, 543 U.S.
at 409 (noting that noncontraband items are not exposed to public view, and there
"[a]ny intrusion on respondent's privacy expectations does not rise to the level of a
constitutionally cognizable infringement").
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in the Supreme Court's precedent to arrive at the conclusion that a
dog sniff of a home is a search. The difficulty with this method is
that the Jardines court has treated intrusiveness differently than the
Supreme Court. Thus far the Supreme Court's use of the term intru-
sive in the context of dog sniffs is not as broad as the Jardines
court's.
2. The Home is Unique
In addition to relying on the intrusiveness of the dog sniff in
Jardines, the Florida court also noted that the home is a unique area
of privacy under the Fourth Amendment.319 The special place the
home occupies under the Constitution and case law is certainly rel-
evant to this discussion, but the majority seemed to connect this
independent point with its discussion of intrusiveness. Immediately
after discussing the Supreme Court's precedent regarding the invio-
lability of the home, the Florida court explained the dog sniff in this
case "was a vigorous and intensive procedure." 320 The court then
went on to discuss the events at Jardines's home as a "public spec-
tacle."321 By failing to clearly delineate the protection of the home
from the public spectacle aspect of the dog sniff, it is unclear that
absent the public embarrassment the court would feel a Fourth
Amendment violation occurred.
3. Potential for Arbitrary Application
The Jardines court's final area of concern is that a ruling that dog
sniffs are not a search would invite discriminatory or arbitrary use
319 See Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 45 (Fla. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan.
6, 2012) (No. 11-564) ("Nowhere is ... [the] right [to be free from unreasonable gov-
ernment intrusion] more resolute than in the private home.").
320 Id. at 46.
321 Id. at 48.
Imaged with Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of Law & Liberty
[Vol. 7:1
The Wolf at the Castle Door
of the procedure. 322 To that end, the court cited established prece-
dent which states: "The basic purpose of the Fourth Amendment, as
recognized in countless decisions of this Court, is to safeguard the
privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by
governmental officials."3 23 The court's concern regarding arbitrary
dog sniffs is well-placed. However, the challenge the court faced
was explaining why the dog sniffs and chemical test in Place, Jacob-
sen, Edmond, and Caballes do not raise the same danger of arbitrary
invasion as the Jardines dog sniff.324 The Jardines court seems to say
that the dog sniffs in Place, Jacobsen, and Caballes avoid the danger of
an arbitrary search because there had been a lawful seizure made
prior to the dog sniffs.325 To support this conclusion, the Jardines
court points out that the use of suspicionless drug-interdiction
roadblocks was held to be impermissible in Edmond.326 The court
322 See id. at 49 ("[I]f government agents can conduct a dog 'sniff test' at a private
residence without any prior evidentiary showing of wrongdoing, there is simply
nothing to prevent the agents from applying the procedure in an arbitrary or dis-
criminatory manner, or based on whim and fancy, at the home of any citizen." (citing
Camara v. Mun. Ct. of the City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967)).
323 Id.
324 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 (holding that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a con-
cededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a
substance that no individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth
Amendment"); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 40 (finding that "[t]he fact that officers walk a
narcotics-detection dog around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis check-
points does not transform the seizure into a search"); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 ("A
chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine
does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy."); Place, 462 U.S. at 707
(sniffing by a "trained canine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment"); Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 36 ("Assuming, without deciding, that
the dog sniff violated Article 2, Section 8, we conclude that Mrs. Guillen's consent
was valid because under Brown's three-factor test, intervening circumstances obviat-
ed any alleged taint and the first dog sniff conducted from outside the garage was
not flagrant police misconduct.").
325 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 49.
326 See id. at 49 n.7 ("'We have never approved a checkpoint program whose pri-
mary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Rather, our
checkpoint cases have recognized only limited exceptions to the general rule that a
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also used Edmond to support a claim that "[tlhere is little doubt,
however, that a dragnet-style sweep of an entire residential neigh-
borhood... without any individualized suspicion of wrongdoing[]
would be impermissible." 327 It does not seem that Edmond necessari-
ly supports this conclusion. Edmond prohibited law enforcement
from using roadblocks "to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing."328 However, it was the seizure in Edmond that was
illegal, not the search.329 In fact, the Court in Edmond reiterated its
position that dog sniffs are not a search.330
Ultimately the Jardines court's attempt to distinguish Place, Ed-
mond, Caballes, and Jacobsen from Jardines seems to misplace its fo-
cus. Rather than focusing on the lawfulness of the seizures in other
contraband exception cases, the strongest argument for distinguish-
ing the sniff in Jardines is the most obvious: Jardines deals with a
home. To be sure, the court repeatedly emphasizes the importance
of the home in this analysis. 3 1 However, the focus on distinguish-
ing Place, Jacobsen, Edmond, and Caballes based on the seizure in-
volved in the case seems to distract from the court's argument.
As a likely preview to the briefs on the merits in the Supreme
Court, a certiorari-stage amicus curiae brief in support of the State
seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion."' (quot-
ing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41)).
327 Id.
32 Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
329 See id. at 40 (finding that "[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog
around the exterior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform
the seizure into a search").
330 See id. ("Like the dog sniff in Place, a sniff by a dog that simply walks around a
car is 'much less intrusive than a typical search.'" (citing United States v. Turpin, 920
F.2d 1377, 1385 (C.A.8 1990))). "Rather, what principally distinguishes these check-
points from those we have previously approved is their primary purpose." Id.
331 See., e.g., Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 36-37 (noting that no case holds that "search[ing]
for evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, absent special needs beyond the nor-
mal need of law enforcement, may be based on anything other than probable cause[,
and this] ... applies with extra force where the sanctity of the home is concerned").
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of Florida attacked the Florida court's use of what it described as a
"public spectacle" test.33 2 The outcome of the Jardines case may re-
late to how the Supreme Court reacts to the Florida courts' use of
public humiliation as creating intrusiveness.
4. Concurrence
Justice Lewis of the Florida Supreme Court concurred with the
majority decision and was joined by two other justices. 333 The con-
currence can best be summed up by Justice Lewis's statement, "In
my view the primary emphasis in this case must fall on [the] con-
cept of 'home' and its sacred place under Fourth Amendment
law."334 Rather than getting bogged down in the question of intru-
siveness, the concurrence repeatedly returned to the heightened
privacy individuals possess in their homes.335 The concurrence also
disagreed with the dissent's declaration that the majority opinion
ignored binding Supreme Court precedent. 3 6 To this charge the
concurrence argued there is no such precedent because the Su-
preme Court has never declared that a dog sniff of a private family
residence was not a search.337 The concurrence concluded by chal-
332 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, State v. Jardines, 73 So. 3d 34 (Fla. 2011),
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 995 (Jan. 6, 2012) (No. 11-564) (claiming that the new public
spectacle test "violates a plethora of this Court's Fourth Amendment cases").
333 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 56-61. Justice Pariente and Justice Labarga also concurred.
Id.
334 Id. at 56.
335 See id. at 57 (noting "the heightened expectation of privacy that one enjoys in
one's home").
336 See id. at 58 ("My esteemed colleague in dissent incorrectly asserts that a recog-
nition of the right of Floridians to be free from unauthorized dog sniffs in their homes
is a violation of United States Supreme Court precedent.").
337 See id. at 59 (noting that "contrary to the assertion of the dissent, there is no
'binding United States Supreme Court precedent' to violate" (quoting id. at 61 (Pol-
ston, J., dissenting))).
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lenging the reliability of dog sniffs in locations, like Florida, where
there is no standardized certification program for narcotics dogs.
338
The concurring opinion has some advantages worth discussing.
First, the concurrence frames the issue as whether the fact that the
dog sniff was conducted on a home makes it a search. 339 Rather than
focusing its discussion on Supreme Court contraband exception
cases, the concurrence focuses on cases involving the home. The
concurrence cites a number of Supreme Court decisions and one
Eleventh Circuit decision to emphasize that "[o]f all the places that
can be searched by the police, one's home is the most sacrosanct,
and receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection."340 More-
over, the concurrence rejects the majority's use of public embar-
rassment by stating that "[t]he level of embarrassment suffered by
the party that has been searched is not a significant part of the con-
stitutional analysis."341
The concurrence is weakest in its explanation of how Caballes
should be treated as part of the court's analysis. Clearly the greatest
challenge to the Jardines holding is the language in Caballes where
Justice Stevens writes that Caballes
is entirely consistent with our recent decision that the use of
a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana
in a home constituted an unlawful search. Critical to [the
Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device was capable of
detecting lawful activity -in that case, intimate details in a
33 See id. at 60. ("[T]he lack of a uniform system of training and certification for
drug detection canines makes it unconstitutionally difficult for a defendant to chal-
lenge a dog sniff after circumstances such as these have occurred.").
339 Id. at 56.
340 Id. at 56 (Lewis, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d
1232,1236 (11th Cir. 2005)).
41 Id. at 61.
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home, such as "at what hour each night the lady of the
house takes her daily sauna and bath." The legitimate ex-
pectation that information about perfectly lawful activity
will remain private is categorically distinguishable from re-
spondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetec-
tion of contraband in the trunk of his car.342
In response to Caballes, the concurrence merely notes the actual
holding of that Court only involved the use of a "dog to sniff a vehi-
cle during a legitimate traffic stop."343 Although this is a critically im-
portant point, the concurrence fails to expressly take on Justice Ste-
vens's statements as dicta or as an inaccurate statement of Kyllo.
5. Dissent
Justice Polston - who was joined by Justice Canady - was the
only Justice to write a dissent.344 The dissent doggedly explains the
Supreme Court precedent, which declares that individuals have "no
legitimate privacy interest in contraband."345 The dissent also cites
all the other courts that have concluded a warrantless dog sniff of
the home is not a search.346 Justice Polston points to Justice Ste-
vens's discussion in Caballes of Kyllo as the final word on the mat-
ter.347 Although the dissent repeatedly emphasizes the Supreme
Court's declaration that individuals do not have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in contraband, it seems a stretch to assert without
equivocation that there is binding precedent to support this broad
statement with regard to the home. Certainly Justice Polston is cor-
rect that most courts to address this issue after Caballes have agreed
with him, but the Supreme Court has yet to resolve the issue.
342 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (internal citations omitted).
343 Jardines, 73 So. 3d at 59.
344 Id. at 61-70 (Polston, J., dissenting).
345 Id. at 64, 67.
346 Id. at 68 n.17.
347 Id. at 66-68.
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C. WHERE WILL THE SUPREME COURT Go?
Now the Court must decide where to go from here. Any deci-
sion carries significant second- and third-order effects. To deny law
enforcement the use of warrantless dog sniffs will, according to
seventeen state attorneys general, significantly impede efforts to
fight crime.348 To fully embrace the contraband exception -and all
its implications -will reduce individual privacy and encourage law
enforcement to devise more techniques and technology to sniff out
contraband. As the Court considers how to proceed three possible
paths seem most likely. First, the Court could fully embrace the con-
traband exception as described in Jacobsen and Caballes.
349 Second,
the Court may adopt a middle ground approach which would in-
corporate its decisions in Kyllo, Caballes, and Jones, declaring that
passive, naturally occurring investigative techniques can be used
provided they otherwise meet the contraband exception require-
ments.350 Finally, the Court might reject dog sniffs and all similar
348 See Brief of the State of Texas et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 13, at 1 ("[Tihe Florida Supreme Court's decision jeopardizes the States' ability
to use [drug-detection dogs, which are a] . . .crucial tool to discover illegal drugs
prior to their distribution.").
349 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408 (2005) ("We have held that any interest
in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 'legitimate,' and thus, governmental
conduct that only reveals the possession of contraband 'compromises no legitimate
privacy interest.'" (quoting Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123)); Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123 ("A
chemical test that merely discloses whether or not a particular substance is cocaine
does not compromise any legitimate interest in privacy.").
350 See generally United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) ("We hold that the
Government's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that
device to monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search.'"); Caballes, 543 U.S.
at 408; Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 123.
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techniques with regard to the home, relying on its conclusion in
Kyllo that all details of the home are intimate."'
1. First Path
The first possible path would fully adopt the language of Jacob-
sen and Caballes and the contraband exception generally. Such a rule
would declare all minimally intrusive investigative techniques,
which only reveal the presence or absence of contraband, are not
searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.352 Such a
decision could have at least three potential effects: First and most
obviously, it could clear the way for unfettered use of dog sniffs of
the home. Second, it would open the door to the use of currently
available technology to detect contraband or illegal activity. Third,
it would create a significant incentive for law enforcement and pri-
vate enterprise to develop more technology that is minimally intru-
sive and sufficiently discerning.
The first and most obvious effect of the Court fully embracing
the Jacobsen-Caballes contraband exception impacts law enforce-
ment's use of dogs on homes. Although several lower courts have
already stated that dog sniffs of the home are permissible,3 53 having
the issue laid to rest by the Supreme Court would remove any lin-
gering reluctance on the part of law enforcement. Currently state
351 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) ("In the home, our cases show,
all details are intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying gov-
ernment eyes.").
352 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
35 See United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1194 (D. Colo. 2008) (find-
ing that the detective "was properly in the secure hallway and the walkway outside
Defendant's apartment when he initiated the dog sniff, and [therefore] Defendant's
motion to suppress the results of the dog sniff are denied"); State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d
1, 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding the canine sniff at the front door because "a
canine sniff is not a Fourth Amendment search... the officer and the dog were law-
fully present at the defendant's front door[,] and... the evidence seized would inevi-
tably have been discovered").
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and federal government agencies use narcotics dogs extensively.
3 5 4
Under such a formulation, dogs could be used to sweep bad neigh-
borhoods as part of a more aggressive community policing pro-
gram. 355 In theory, dogs could be used during all other lawful
searches. Thus, if the officer is present to execute a search warrant
that describes a handgun, a narcotics dog could accompany the of-
ficer. If the dog were to alert while in the home, the alert could be
used as evidence to seek a second search warrant for narcotics.
Next, a fully realized Jacobsen-Caballes contraband exception
would permit law enforcement to use currently available investiga-
tive techniques/technology in the home. In effect, such a formula
would create an exception to the rule regarding the home and tech-
nology- a backdoor to the firm and bright line described in Kyllo.
3 56
It might seem unlikely that the Court would be willing to entertain
such an exception. However, at least one member of the Court may
have already entertained such a formulation during the oral argu-
ment in Caballes. During an exchange between Justice Kennedy, Jus-
tice Scalia, and Attorney General Madigan, Justice Scalia made the
following statement:
354 See Brief of the State of Texas et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra
note 13, at 1-3 (noting that "all States have a keen interest in combating illegal drugs,
and [dirug-detection dogs play a vital role in these efforts").
3-5 The majority in Jardines argues this use of dogs is prohibited based on Edmond.
However, that conclusion seems suspect and is discussed in the body of the article.
This concern was also raised by Professor Leslie A. (Lunney) Shoebotham in her 2009
article Has the Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of the Ca-
nine Sniff Doctrine to Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 831 (2009).
356 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when "the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previous-
ly have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth
Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant").
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[A]re you sure that Kyllo ...would have come out the
same way if the only thing. . that the imaging could pick
out is not any of the other private activities in the home, but
the only thing it could possibly discern is a dead body with
a knife through the heart? Are you sure the case would
have come out the same way? I'm not at all sure.
35 7
Today, the investigative technique that seems best suited to the
contraband exception involves computers. 358 For years the govern-
ment has been using a technique called hash-value searches to find
digital contraband on computers .3 9 Hash values have been used to
create a digital fingerprint for computer programs for over fifteen
years. 360 Hash values are currently used during criminal investiga-
357 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005) (No.
03-923).
3-8 In 2005, Professor Orin Kerr and Professor Salgado exchanged law review arti-
cles discussing whether, based on Caballes, hash-value searches were permissible. See
Salgado, supra note 222 and Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119
HARV. L. REV. 531 (2005).
359 See Marcia Hofmann, Arguing For Suppression of 'Hash' Evidence, 33 CHAMPION
20, 20 (May 2009) ("A hash may also help to assess whether a suspect's computer
contains files already known to be contraband."). But see, Stephen Hoffman, An Illus-
tration of Hashing and Its Effect on Illegal File Content in the Digital Age, INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. L. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at 6, 9, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1564980 (not-
ing the "shortcomings of the use of hash values in pursuing the tech-savvy criminal[,
which is that] ... [s]ince each file theoretically has a unique electronic fingerprint, the
smallest alteration to any existing file will cause that file's hash value to change dras-
tically").
360 See John P. Tomaszewski, Comment, The Pandora's Box of Cyberspace: State Regu-
lation of Digital Signatures and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 417, 434
(1997) (describing the digital signature procedure, which includes the use of a hash
value).
In a nutshell, a digital signature uses a dual key (one public, one private)
encryption method to "hash" (or compress) the value of a message in such
a manner that the recipient knows the only person who could have sent
that message is the holder of a specific private key that corresponds with
the published key. The receiver need not know the private key, as the mes-
sage can be decrypted by using the author's published key. The digital
signature is not just the public key of the sender; it also includes a hash
value of the text of the message. Thus, there are three components of a dig-
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tions where law enforcement is permitted to search an individual's
computer. 361 The protocol for such searches usually involves mak-
ing a "mirror image" of the computer's memory and reviewing the
data off-site.362 To ensure the copy of the computer's memory is ac-
curate, a hash value is created.363 This value verifies that the copy is
exactly the same as the original.3 6 In addition to creating hash val-
ues for whole hard drives, there are hash values for particular
files. 365 As of 2005, the FBI's Cyber Crimes Innocent Images data-
base had over 30,000 hash values of known images of child pornog-
raphy.366 Hash-value databases are not limited to child pornogra-
ital signature: 1) the sender's public key, 2) the hash value of the message,
and 3) the authorizing certificate. In practice, the methodology is as simple
as clicking a "verify" or a "sign" button in your browser or e-mail soft-
ware. The computer automatically verifies the message by running the
message through the same hash algorithm the sender used. If the hash
value appended to the plain text message is not the same as the hash value
generated by the computer of the receiver (this assumes both sender and
receiver are using a standard hash algorithm), then the receiver knows
something has changed in the transmission process and is on notice that
the message received is not exactly what was sent.
Id. at 433-434 (footnotes omitted).
361 See Hofmann, supra note 359, at 20 ("Hashing is an effective forensic technique
for examining information on computers to identify, verify, and authenticate data.").
362 See Salgado, supra note 222, at 38 ("Hash algorithms are used to confirm that




365 See id. at 40 ("There are now libraries of hash values calculated for common
programs and files.").
366 See Stephen Hoffman, An Illustration of Hashing and Its Effect on Illegal File Con-
tent in the Digital Age, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L. J., Feb. 22, 2010, at 8 n. 25, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564980 ("This database, known as the 'Innocent Images
National Initiative,' contained more than 100,000 distinct hash values of known child
pornography as of 2005." (citing Wayne Jekot, "Computer Forensics, Search Strate-
gies, and the Particularity Requirement," 7 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 16 n.120 (2007), availa-
ble at http://tlp.law.pitt.edu/articles/Vol_12]ekot.pdf (last visited July 12, 2009))).
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phy.367 Other government agencies, like the National Drug Intelli-
gence Center, also maintain hash-value libraries that include other
forms of digital contraband.368
Hash-value searches, even more than dog sniffs, ensure that the
only information that is conveyed is the presence or absence of con-
traband. Computer programs exist that search only for files that are
a hash-value match with known digital contraband. 369 If the Court
were to accept a Jacobsen-Caballes contraband exception, it would
seem permissible, at least under the Fourth Amendment, for the
government to introduce a program on an individual's computer to
search for known digital contraband. Such a search program could
be introduced without the owner of the computer knowing by us-
ing what is known as a Trojan horse program. 370 Both the U.S. and
German governments have been accused of using Trojan horse pro-
grams in the past.37' Once the program was introduced into the
computer, it could search files until it found a file containing digital
contraband. Then the program would automatically alert law en-
forcement. Law enforcement could then use the information to se-
cure a search warrant.
367 See Orin Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 546
(2005) ("The National Drug Intelligence Center has calculated and collected common
hash values for nearly every known application and operating system file and for
many images of child pornography in a database called the Hashkeeper.").
3m Id.
369 See Salgado, supra note 222, at 45 ("Hash-based file detection works extraordi-
narily well in identifying only those files that are exact matches ... ").
370 See Sara M. Smyth, Back to the Future: Crimes and Punishment in Second Life, 36
RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 18, 69 n. 302 (2009) (noting that SurfRecon has de-
veloped the most expansive database "for child-pornography images in the world");
MARC LIBERATORE ET AL., FORENSIC INVESTIGATION OF PEER-TO-PEER FILE SHARING
NETWORKS 7 (2010) (describing how to gather "evidence using the Gnutella proto-
col").
371 Bob Yirka, Hacker Group Accuses German Government of Using Illegal Trojan Horse,
PYSORG.COM (Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-10-hacker-
group-accuses-german-illegal.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2012).
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Finally, a Jacobsen-Caballes contraband exception would create a
powerful incentive for law enforcement to create more discerning
and unintrusive technology that would qualify as non-searches. The
FBI's National Institute of Justice provides updates and funding to
advance investigative technology.372 In 2010, the NIJ published a
fact sheet that provides an introduction to portal contraband detec-
tion technology. 373 The fact sheet discusses several technologies
374
that with modification could meet the criteria established in Jacobsen
and Caballes. Of particular note is ion-scan technology. 375 An ion
scanner samples the air around a person, vehicle, or living space to
detect contraband. 376 Also significant is backscatter x-ray technolo-
gy. 37 7 Today this technology is used at airports, jails, and national
borders.378 The device works by exposing objects or individuals to
low doses of x-rays and then passing the information through ana-
lytical software. 379 The software then creates a graphic image of
372 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CORRECTIONS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PORTAL CONTRABAND
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY: FACT SHEET, 1 (June 2010), available at
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Portal%20Primer-web.pdf.
373 See id. (noting that "[ilt will help the correctional professional increase under-
standing of contraband detection and hopefully generate new thinking related to this
area").
374 See id. at 2-4 (discussing Metal Detectors, Millimeter Wave Detection Devices,
Magnetometer (Gradiometer) Metal Detection, Electric Field Tomagraphy, Heartbeat
Detection, Ion Scan Technology, and Backscatter X-Ray Contraband Detection).
375 See id. at 3 (noting that ion scan technology "senses organic compounds and
typically is used"). See also Robyn Burrows, Judicial Confusion and The Digital Dog
Sniff" Pragmatic Solutions Permitting Warrantless Hashing of Known Illegal Files, 19 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 255 (2011).
376 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CORRECTIONS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, supra note 372, at 3.
377 See id. at 4 ("IT]he software produces an immediate graphic display of a human
with clear outlines of any contraband on the body. It will image all objects on a body,
both organic and inorganic.").
378 Id.
379 Id.
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what has been scanned. 380 Efforts are currently being made to fur-
ther enhance the imaging software so that it only reveals whether
the object or individual scanned possesses contraband.3 8'
It is of course difficult to imagine where technology will take
law enforcement. This is even harder to know if police are given the
incentive that a broad contraband exception would supply. What
can be known is that law enforcement will take advantage of every
tool the courts give them in what Justice Jackson described as "the
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime." 382 With that
knowledge must come the realization that such an expansive con-
traband exception will lead to more technology used by law en-
forcement on homes.
In Jacobsen, Justice Stevens cites a Michigan Law Review article
in support of his statement that "governmental conduct that can
reveal whether a substance is cocaine, and no other arguably 'pri-
vate' fact, compromises no legitimate privacy interest."383 The arti-
cle was written by Professor Arnold H. Loewy and is entitled "The
380 Id.
ml See Jon Hilkevitch, O'Hare to Get Less Intrusive Body Scanner, CHL TRIB., Oct. 23,
2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-10-23/travel/ct-met-tsa-ohare-body-
scanners-1023-20121023_lbody-scanner-generic-outline-tsa-security-officer (ex-
plaining that the new body scanners at O'Hare International Airport only use a ge-
neric picture and are "equipped with 'automated target recognition' software that
detects any possible threats under a passenger's clothing"); NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE,
GUIDE TO THE TECHNOLOGIES OF CONCEALED WEAPON AND CONTRABAND IMAGING
AND DETECTION, NIJ GUIDE 602-00, 3-4 (2002), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/184432.pdf (describing a sophisticated image-
based system that could verbally sound for contraband, but noting that "Iflor the
computer to recognize a specific weapon or threat item, the computer will have to
compare the threat item with an electronic catalog of images of uniquely-shaped
threat items... ").
3 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
383 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984) (citing Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH.L.REv. 1229 (1983)).
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Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent." 384 In
the article, Professor Loewy proposes:
In a Utopian society, each policeman would be equipped
with an evidence-detecting divining rod. He would walk
up and down the street and whenever the divining rod de-
tected evidence of crime, it would locate the evidence. First,
it would single out the house, then the drawer, and finally
the evidence itself.
38 5
Although Professor Loewy's position clearly influenced Justice
Stevens, Professor Loewy acknowledges that some have voiced
concern that his position conjures images of Orwell's "1984. " 36 Pro-
fessor Loewy also acknowledges that at least one author would ar-
gue that his position is inconsistent with how the Founders must
have viewed the Amendment. 38 7 Colonial objections to writs of as-
sistance were intimately tied to their objections to the laws those
writs were used to enforce. 388 It seems reasonable to question
whether colonial objections to the writs would have been silenced
had they been carried out by specially trained dogs that would only
alert to the smell of contraband tea or sugar. Significant disagree-
ment over whether Professor Loewy's vision of the future is utopi-
an or dystopian is certainly possible. However, should the Jacobsen-
Caballes expansive view of the contraband exception be adopted, it
cannot be disputed that the Court will have moved closer to
Loewy's vision.
3m Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81
MICH.L.REV. 1229 (1983).
385 Id. at 1244.
m6 Id. at 1246.
387 Id. at 1246, n.86.
3m Michael Campbell, Defining a Fourth Amendment Search: A Critique of the Supreme
Court's Post-Katz Jurisprudence, 61 WASH. L. REv 191, 203 (1986).
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2. Second Path: Dog Sniffs of the Home are Sui Generis
The second possible path for the Court would be to accept dog
sniffs of the home but use the Jardines opinion to place limits on the
contraband exception. Such an opinion would use Kyllo and Jones to
explain why the dog sniff of a home might be permissible while
other investigative techniques-even if sufficiently discerning and
minimally intrusive -would not be acceptable.389
Since Caballes, several courts have confronted the apparent con-
flict between Kyllo and Caballes.390 Some lower courts have accepted
Justice Stevens's explanation in Caballes for why the two opinions
are not in conflict, while other courts appear to be unconvinced. 9
These courts have arrived at another explanation for why a dog
sniff of the home may not violate Kyllo's seemingly complete bar to
law enforcement using extra sensory techniques to gather infor-
mation about the interior of a home. These courts have focused on
two distinctions between dog sniffs and thermal-imaging devices.392
389 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012) ("We hold that the Govern-
ment's installation of a GPS device on a target's vehicle, and its use of that device to
monitor the vehicle's movements, constitutes a 'search."'); Kyllo v. United States, 533
U.S. 27, 37 (2001) ("In the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, be-
cause the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.").
390 See, e.g., United States v. Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190 (D. Colo. 2008);
State v. Jardines, 9 So. 3d I (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
391 See Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (noting that even though this court relies
on different factors for distinguishing Kyllo and Caballes, "[dlefendant's reliance on
Kyllo in the context of a dog sniff test is misplaced... [because] the Supreme Court in
Caballes distinguished a dog sniff test from the use of thermal imaging equipment
considered in Kyllo"); Jardines, 9 So. 3d at 5 (noting that the factors it considers also
led "the Court in Caballes to note that its conclusion that the dog sniff involved there
was lawful was consistent with its earlier decision in Kyllo").
392 See Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (disagreeing with the claim that "a drug-
sniffing dog-like thermal imaging equipment-is a specialized device that reveals
private details about the interior of a home"); id. at 1191 (citing Fitzgerald v. Mary-
land, 153 Md. App. 601, 837 A.2d 989, 1037 (2003) (citing Blair v. Kentucky, 181 Ky.
218, 204 S.W. 67, 68 (Ky.Ct.App.1918))) ("In 1918, a court in Kentucky noted dogs
had been employed as scent-detectors for hundreds of years."). See also infra notes
394 and 397 and accompanying text.
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The first distinction can be summed up in the phrase: a dog's
nose is not technology.393 At the heart of the Kyllo decision was the
Court's effort to prevent technology from shrinking Fourth
Amendment protections.394 Courts that have focused on this distinc-
tion point out that a dog's nose has not been augmented by me-
chanical advances. 395 Based on this fact, the chief concern of Kyllo is
not at play.
The second distinction these courts have suggested is that dogs,
unlike thermal-imaging devices, were used to gather information
that humans could not have gathered in 1791.396 This distinction is
important because Kyllo reiterates the position declared in Carroll
that, "the Fourth Amendment is to be construed in the light of what
was deemed an unreasonable search and seizure when it was
adopted." 397 Since thermal-imaging devices, or anything like them,
did not exist at the time the Fourth Amendment was adopted, the
use of such a device in the absence of a warrant cannot be consid-
ered reasonable.398 In 1791, the only way to gather the same infor-
mation the thermal scan provides would be to enter a constitution-
ally protected area-thus a warrant would be required.399 Since
393 See Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (disagreeing with the claim that "a drug-
sniffing dog-like thermal imaging equipment-is a specialized device that reveals
private details about the interior of a home").
394 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 28 (2001) (worrying about leaving "the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing technology").
395 See Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1190 (disagreeing with the claim that "a drug-
sniffing dog-like thermal imaging equipment-is a specialized device that reveals
private details about the interior of a home").
396 See id. at 1191.
397 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925). See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34 (assur-
ing the "preservation of that degree of privacy against government that existed when
the Fourth Amendment was adopted").
398 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 34.
399 See id. ("[O]btaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding
the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physi-
cal 'intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,' constitutes a search-at least
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dogs were used in 1791 to track smells that humans could not sense,
they could be considered reasonable. 40 These courts cite to no con-
crete examples of courts accepting the use of a dog to track a smell
to a house without a warrant. Rather, the courts point to this dis-
tinction as further evidence that the use of a dog to sniff at an indi-
vidual's home was not the danger that the Kyllo decision was de-
signed to prevent.40
If the Court were to adopt the above analysis, it would go a
long way toward returning dog sniffs to their earlier status as sui
generis, at least with regard to the home. If adopted, any contraband
exception technique would have to use a biological rather than a
mechanical tool to gather information about the home. Further,
such a biological tool would have to have been used in 1791 for the
purpose of gathering information beyond human capabilities. In
other words, dogs would again be unique.
Should the Court choose to follow this second path, at least one
lingering question remains, especially in the wake of Jones. The
question is whether bringing a dog onto the porch of a home with-
out a warrant constitutes a trespass within the meaning of the Jones
decision. The police in Jardines walked their narcotics dog up the
driveway of the suspect's home and to the front door without a
warrant.4°2 Although it remains possible the Court will find this
action a trespass, such a result seems unlikely. Under such a tres-
pass theory, every individual who approached Jardines's front door
where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public use." (quoting
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512 (1961))).
400 See Leah Waldron, Police Dog Facts, EHow,
http://www.ehow.com/about_6569233_police-dog.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2012)
("[Bly 1610, the British colonists of Jamestown were using dogs in anti-Indian
measures, specifically in the search and seizing of American natives.").
401 See Broadway, 580 F. Supp. 2d at 1191 (noting that because dogs have been used
as "scent-detectors for hundreds of years[,] ... [t]o the extent a dog can detect a
scent, therefore, it does not detect anything that 'would have been unknowable'
without physical intrusion when the Fourth Amendment was adopted in 1791").
402 Id.
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would be committing a tort. Girl scouts, trick-or-treaters, and unin-
vited family members would be committing an offense. Although
the Supreme Court has never expressly declared that police walking
onto a citizen's real estate and up to his front door is permissible, it
has said all but that in Kentucky v. King.
403
In King, police witnessed a drug deal take place near an apart-
ment complex and then sought to arrest the suspects.4°4 One of the
suspects briefly eluded police.405 A pursuing officer followed the
suspect to a part of the complex that included two apartments.
40 6
The suspect went into the apartment on the right. 40 7 The officer
heard a door shut and could smell the odor of burnt marijuana
coming from the apartment on the left.40 8 The officer knocked loud-
ly on the door and identified himself as the police. 40 9 The officer
then heard people in the apartment moving and objects in the
apartment being moved.410 Believing evidence was about to be de-
stroyed, the officer kicked the door in and found three people and a
large quantity of drugs. 411 The Court ruled the search was permissi-
ble under the exigent circumstances doctrine. 412 During its discus-
sion of the police officer's conduct the Court noted that "[w]hen law
enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a
door, they do no more than any private citizen might do."413 It may
403 See Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1852 (2011) (holding that "[t]he exigent
circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or
threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment").









412 Id. at 1863.
413 Id. at 1862.
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be argued that the home in King is an apartment and thus police did
not have to cross King's real property to get to the front door. This
distinction would seem to miss the Court's emphasis. The King
Court's holding appears to say that it is true that when police are
without a warrant they do not have any more authority to enter
upon a person's property than the average citizen, but they do not
possess any less either.
Although Jones may not have a dramatic impact on the outcome
of Jardines, the Court has the opportunity to use the Jones decision to
limit the contraband exception inside and outside the home. In
Jones, the Court resurrected physical trespass as a basis for deter-
mining a Fourth Amendment violation.41 4 Many of the potential
applications of the contraband exception involve technologies that
make some form of contact with the objects they are searching.
Hash value Trojan horse programs, backscatter x-ray technology,
and millimeter-wave-detection devices all involve some contact
between the device and the object being examined.1 5 In Jones, Jus-
tice Alito noted that some jurisdictions have accepted such "elec-
tron" contacts as trespasses.1 6 Jardines offers the Court the oppor-
tunity to expand its discussion in Jones to make clear that the con-
traband exception should be limited to passive techniques. Thus,
414 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 (2012) ("[Flor most of our history
the Fourth Amendment was understood to embody a particular concern for gov-
ernment trespass upon the areas ('persons, houses, papers, and effects') it enumer-
ates. Katz did not repudiate that understanding.").
415 NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE: NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CORRECTIONS TECHNOLOGY CENTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PORTAL CONTRABAND
DETECTION TECHNOLOGY: FACT SHEET, 2-4 (June 2010), available at
https://www.justnet.org/pdf/00-Portal%20Primer-web.pdf.
416 See Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 962 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing CompuServe, Inc. v.
Cyber Promotions, Inc. 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1021 (S.D. Ohio 1997); Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v.
Bezenek, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1559, 1566 n. 6 (1996)) ("In recent years, courts have wres-
tled with the application of this old tort in cases involving unwanted electronic con-
tact with computer systems, and some have held that even the transmission of elec-
trons that occurs when a communication is sent from one computer to another is
enough.").
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any technology that uses a ray or beam that must make contact with
a constitutionally protected zone of privacy would be considered to
have trespassed. Consistent with Justice Scalia's opinion, such a
trespass would have been committed in "an attempt to find some-
thing or to obtain information,"417 and thereby would be a search.41 8
In order to use one of these devices consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, either a warrant or some other exception beyond the
contraband exception would be necessary. Such limitations on the
contraband exception might be consistent with the 9-0 holding in
Jones.419 Furthermore, among the Justices who joined with Justice
Alito's concurrence was Justice Ginsburg, 420 who had dissented in
Caballes, expressing concern about the potential for pervasive and
arbitrary use of narcotics dogs.42'
3. Third Path: Kyllo Meant What It Said
The third possible path for the Court would be to reject the use
of narcotics dogs in the home by reiterating the Court's holding in
Kyllo.422 In Jardines, the Court could remove any confusion created
by Justice Stevens's opinion in Caballes,423 stating once again that
417 Id. at 951 n.5 (majority opinion).
418 Id.
419 See id. at 949 ("We hold that the Government's installation of a GFS device on a
target's vehicle, and its use of that device to monitor the vehicle's movements, consti-
tutes a 'search'.").
420 Id. at 957-64 (Alito, J., concurring).
421 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 417-25 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). "Un-
der today's decision, every traffic stop could become an occasion to call in the dogs,
to the distress and embarrassment of the law-abiding population." Id. at 422 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting).
42 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001).
423 See Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410 ("A dog sniff conducted during a concededly lawful
traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no
individual has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."). "This
conclusion is entirely consistent with our recent decision" in Kyllo. Id. at 409. "Critical
to that decision was the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activi-
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"[i]n the home, our cases show, all details are intimate details, be-
cause the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes."424
At the heart of this path is recognizing that the home is unique
among constitutionally protected locations. The Court's use in past
cases of terms such as "sanctity," "liberty," and "security, 425 aug-
ments the Fourth Amendment's concern for privacy.426 The Court's
recent reinvigoration of the trespass theory could also add strength
to this position.
As discussed above, the Court has not succumbed to the temp-
tation of permitting minimally intrusive investigative techniques in
the home without a warrant.427 In Hicks, the Court held the act of
moving a stolen object to reveal a serial number without a warrant
was too much.428 Further, the Court chose to reject the use of the
lesser standard of reasonable suspicion for a lesser search in the
home.429 According to the majority in Hicks, "a search is a search."
430
In Kyllo, the Court refused to permit a device, which was used from
ty-in that case, intimate details in a home[.]" Id. at 409-10. "The legitimate expecta-
tion that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categori-
cally distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nonde-
tection of contraband in the trunk of his car." Id. at 410.
424 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
425 See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589 (1980) (noting that to be arrested in
the home is "an invasion of the sanctity of the home"); Boyd v. United States, 116
U.S. 616, 630 (1886) (noting that "it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of person-
al security, personal liberty, and private property").
426 See Thomas K. Clancy, WAhat is a Search Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 1, 1-51 (2006) (focusing on "what governmental methods of
obtaining tangible things or information are or should be considered invasions of the
individual's protected interest and, hence, a search within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment").
427 See supra note 416 and accompanying text.
428 See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324-25 (1987) (finding that "Officer Nelson's
moving of the equipment, however, did constitute a 'search' separate and apart from
the search for the shooter, victims, and weapons that was the lawful objective of his
entry into the apartment").
429 See id. at 328 (holding that "[pirobable cause to believe the equipment was sto-
len" was required).
430 Id. at 325.
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a public road, which passively revealed nothing more than the rela-
tive warmth of sections of the defendant's home.43' In response to
the argument that the device in Kyllo never penetrated the home,
but only acquired information that escaped the home, the majority
noted that in Katz the Court had "rejected such a mechanical inter-
pretation of the Fourth Amendment." 432 The Court's refusal to per-
mit a lesser standard for a lesser search
433 as it had in Terry v. Ohio
4 34
and its refusal to accept that a search of a home could reveal only
"non-intimate" details, 435 reflects the uniqueness of the home.436
431 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) ("Where, as here, the Govern-
ment uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private
home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the
surveillance is a Fourth Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable
without a warrant.").
432 Id. at 35.
433 See id. at 40 (leaving it up to the "District Court to determine whether, without
the evidence it provided, the search warrant issued in this case was supported by
probable cause").
434 See 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (requiring the officer to have only "reasonable grounds
to believe that petitioner was armed and dangerous").
435 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
436 As discussed in the section that reviews the Caballes decision, some may argue
there remains a narrow distinction between intimate and non-intimate details. See
supra notes 125-48 and accompanying text. According to Justice Stevens, at a mini-
mum, a non-intimate detail would include the possession of contraband. Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005). It could also be argued that this view has support
in Florida v. Riley and California v. Ciraolo where the Court discussed that no intimate
details of the home or curtilage was revealed when the police flew aircraft over the
defendants' properties and discovered drugs in the curtilage. Florida v. Riley, 488
U.S. 445, 449-52 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). It seems Kyllo
rejected this position, resting instead on "otherwise-imperceptibility." Kyllo, 533 U.S.
at 38 n.5. Further, Riley and Ciraolo rested principally on the fact that both defendants
were exposing their drugs to anyone who chose to fly over their homes. See Ciraolo,
476 U.S. at 2015 ("The Fourth Amendment simply does not require the police travel-
ing in the public airways at this altitude to obtain a warrant in order to observe what
is visible to the naked eye."); Riley, 488 U.S. at 450 (arriving "at the same conclusion"
as Ciraolo). In both decisions, the Court notes that the observations were made with
the naked eye. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 215; Riley, 488 U.S. at 450.
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An additional argument, raised by two of the amicus briefs
filed in the Jardines case, deserves discussion.437 The briefs submit-
ted by Fourth Amendment Scholars 438 and the National and Florida
Associations of Criminal Defense Lawyers 4 9 have raised a scientific
challenge to the traditional belief that a dog sniff only reveals the
presence or absence of contraband." 0 In challenging the science,
both briefs argue that dog sniffs are more like the thermal-imaging
device in Kyllo than they are like the chemical test in Jacobsen.44 '
Thus, the use of dog sniffs of the home are impermissible for the
same reason the use of the thermal-imaging device in Kyllo was im-
permissible.
44 2
Both briefs cite an article by Professor Leslie (Lunney) Shoebo-
tham to explain that when a narcotics dog "alerts" it does not alert
to the specific smell of illegal drugs.443 Instead, dogs alert to odors
437 The same argument was also raised in Leslie A. (Lunney) Shoebotham, Has the
Fourth Amendment Gone to the Dogs?: Unreasonable Expansion of Canine Sniff Doctrine to
Include Sniffs of the Home, 88 OR. L. REV. 829, 837-39, 867 (2009).
438 Brief for Fourth Amendment Scholars as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
State of Florida v. Jardines (2012) (No. 11-564) 2012 WL 2641847 [hereinafter Fourth
Amendment].
439 Brief for the Nat'l Assoc. of Crim. Def. Lawyers and the Fla. Assoc. of Crim.
Def. Lawyers as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, State v. Jardines (2012) (No.
11-564), 2012 WL 2641848 [hereinafter National Association].
440 Fourth Amendment, at 1-35. National Association, at 1-22.
441 See Fourth Amendment, at 6 ("Here, the canine drug-detection sniff makes pos-
sible sense-enhanced police inferencing about the interior of the home that is analo-
gous to the technology-assisted inferencing about a home's interior that the Court
rejected in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), and United States v. Karo, 468 U.S.
705 (1984)."); National Association, at 3 ("Like the thermal imager in Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001), a dog sniff thus reveals details about the interior of the
home beyond the mere presence or absence of contraband.").
442 See Fourth Amendment, at 2 ("[A] warrant is also required when police direct a
device at a home to gain information, even if that device does no more than provide
measurements that enable police to infer that illegal activity is taking place inside.")
(citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)). National Association, at 3 ("And
because '[iun the home, .. .all details are intimate details,' . .. a suspicionless dog sniff
of a house violates the privacy right at the heart of the Fourth Amendment." (quot-
ing Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37)).
443 Fourth Amendment, at 18-32; National Association, at 11-15.
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that are associated with contraband.4 4 The problem with this fact is
that some noncontraband items share the same odors with contra-
band.445 The majority in Caballes reasoned that a dog sniff was dif-
ferent from a thermal scan because the dog sniff only revealed the
presence or absence of contraband." 6 Based on a number of scien-
tific studies, however, that assertion appears to be incorrect. 447 Ac-
cording to the amicus briefs, dog sniffs can reveal the presence of
certain flowers, perfume, and food additives, in addition to the
presence of contraband." 8 The briefs do not directly attack the effec-
tiveness of dog sniffs as contraband detectors, rather the briefs
point out that the underlying premise of Justice Stevens's dicta in
Caballes is factually incorrect.449 Thus, when a dog alerts, it is uncer-
tain that the alert is due to contraband.5 0
444 Fourth Amendment, at 19; National Association, at 13.
445 Fourth Amendment, at 19; National Association, at 13.
46 Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409-10 (2005) (holding that "[a] dog sniff con-
ducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment").
44' Fourth Amendment, at 19-32; National Association, at 13-15.
448 Fourth Amendment, at 19; National Association, at 13-15.
449 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 409-10 (internal citations omitted). Justice Stevens stated:
[The decision in Caballes] is entirely consistent with our recent decision that
the use of a thermal-imaging device to detect the growth of marijuana in a
home constituted an unlawful search. Critical to [the Kyllol decision was
the fact that the device was capable of detecting lawful activity -in that
case, intimate details in a home, such as "'at what hour each night the lady
of the house takes her daily sauna and bath." The legitimate expectation
that information about perfectly lawful activity will remain private is cate-
gorically distinguishable from respondent's hopes or expectations concern-
ing the nondetection of contraband in the trunk of his car.
Id.
450 See Fourth Amendment, at 3 ("Therefore, rather than detecting the contraband
itself, a detection dog's alert to these entirely-legal molecules or compounds instead
produces an inference that contraband is also present."); National Association, at 13-
15 ("Accordingly, dogs trained to detect drugs like cocaine, heroin, and ecstasy may
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Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this argument is that it
does not appear to be directed at challenging the reliability of dog
sniffs to detect contraband. Rather, this argument asserts that a dog
sniff is very much like the thermal-imaging device in Kyllo.45' Be-
cause a dog sniff can reveal the presence or absence of both lawful
and unlawful activity, a warrant is required.4 52 The strength of this
argument is that if the Court chose to adopt it, the earlier dog sniff
cases could remain intact while extension of dog sniffs to the home
could be prevented. Because the restrictions on the governmental
action described in Kyllo only applies to investigative techniques
directed at the home,453 dog sniffs of luggage, cars, and so forth
would still be permissible.
Although the Court could adopt the approach suggested by the
amicus briefs and clearly preserve its earlier precedent regarding
dog sniffs, it would leave open the question of whether a true con-
traband detector could be used on a home. The decision in Jones and
the granting of certiorari in Jardines gives the Court the opportunity
to take a definitive step regarding the Fourth Amendment and the
home. The Court's theory of the Fourth Amendment articulated in
Jones might be described as "trespass plus." Five Justices agree that
a physical trespass alone can create a Fourth Amendment violation
and in its absence, the Court should apply the Katz reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy test.4 5 4 The return of the trespass theory may
also alert to a host of household items that contain the same 'signature' odors, even
when no illegal narcotics are present.").
451 See Fourth Amendment, at 6.
452 See Fourth Amendment, at 2.
453 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 40 (holding that when "the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previous-
ly have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth
Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant").
454 See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 ("[Tlhe Katz reasonable-
expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, but not substituted for, the common-law
trespassory test."); id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("As the majority's opinion
makes clear, however, Katz's reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but
did not displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that preceded it.").
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signal recognition by the Court that in its effort to create Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that keeps up with evolving technology
it left an important aspect of the amendment behind. Although pri-
vacy is of course part of what is protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment, since before Boyd it has been recognized that the rights of
property are likewise implicated.455 According to Lord Camden,
"The great end for which men entered into society was to secure
their property."456 When the property involved is a home, the bun-
dle of rights associated with that property includes liberty, sanctity
and security. 57 In Boyd, the Court ruled that even when the gov-
ernment does not actually enter an individual's home, a Fourth
Amendment violation can occur when the government commits an
invasion of "the sanctity of a man's home."4 58 By creating a "tres-
pass plus" approach to the Fourth Amendment, the Court reinforc-
es its holdings in Hicks and Kyllo by returning to the recognition
that property rights and privacy rights complement one another but
neither encompasses the other entirely. 59
It may be argued that the Jardines dog sniff passes the Jones
"trespass plus" theory of the Fourth Amendment. The officer con-
ducting the dog sniff did not commit a trespass in walking Franky
451 See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886).
456 Id.
457 Id. at 630.
458 Id.
4-9 See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (holding that when "the Government
uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the sur-
veillance is a Fourth Amendment 'search,' and is presumptively unreasonable with-
out a warrant"); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 321 (1987) (finding that when exigent
circumstances existed for police to enter an apartment, it was not a seizure to record
serial numbers off of a stolen turntable, but moving "the equipment was a 'search'
separate and apart from the search that was the lawful objective of entering the
apartment").
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up to Jardines's door.460 Further, the Court has made clear under
Place, Edmond, and Caballes that dog sniffs do not infringe on a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.46' Although such an argument has
superficial appeal, it misses the core value of the Kyllo declaration
that everything in the home, which is kept from prying government
eyes, is protected.462 Since Carroll, the Court has declared that the
Fourth Amendment is to be interpreted consistent with what it
meant when it was adopted.463 From the beginning, the Fourth
Amendment was one of several constitutional provisions meant as a
check on the arbitrary application of power.464 The arbitrary power
the Fourth Amendment was concerned with is the power to arbi-
trarily search.465 Part of why the Florida Supreme Court rejected the
canine sniff in that case was out of concern that to do otherwise
would clear the way for arbitrary use of the technique. If the Court
were to declare that canine sniffs of the home are not searches, the
Court would be opening the way, at least in this one respect, to the
460 See United States v. Titemore, 437 F.3d 251, 252 (2d Cir. 2006) ("Because the
trooper approached a principal entrance to the home using a route that other visitors
could be expected to take, we hold that the trooper's actions did not offend the
Fourth Amendment.").
461 See Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410 (2005) (holding that "[a] dog sniff con-
ducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment"); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000)
(finding that "[t]he fact that officers walk a narcotics-detection dog around the exte-
rior of each car at the Indianapolis checkpoints does not transform the seizure into a
search"); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (sniffing by a "trained ca-
nine-did not constitute a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment").
462 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
463 See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (noting that the Fourth
Amendment "is to be construed in light of what was deemed to be an unreasonable
search and seizure when it was adopted").
464 See GPO AccEss, FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE, 1209, available at
http:/ /www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-
5.pdf ("That the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect against arbitrary arrests
as well as against unreasonable searches was early assumed by Chief Justice Mar-
shall." (citing Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. 448 (1806))).
465 Id.
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government conducting arbitrary searches of homes. This, in effect,
gives law enforcement a general warrant for a specific set of items.
This does not seem consistent with what is known of the Founders'
views of the Fourth Amendment.
The Kyllo complete bar 466 is an effective bright line rule. It rea-
sonably applies the Court's precedent that "a search is a search,"
467
and it prohibits the government from conducting arbitrary searches
of the home. The Kyllo bar protects the privacy of an individual's
home, and its sanctity, liberty and security.
CONCLUSION
The path of warrantless dog sniffs from an individual's luggage
to front door has been prolonged but seemingly inevitable. In 1984
Justice Brennan dissented from the majority in Jacobsen, cautioning
that the rule the Court had created would permit warrantless
searches of homes.468 Justice Brennan wrote:
In fact, the Court's analysis is so unbounded that if a device
were developed that could detect, from the outside of a
building, the presence of cocaine inside, there would be no
constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a resi-
dential neighborhood and using the device to identify all
homes in which the drug is present.469
Justice Brennan, however, followed this observation with the
prediction that "this Court ultimately stands ready to prevent this
Orwellian world from coming to pass." 470 The Court's holdings in
466 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 28.
46
7 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987).
468 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109,133-143 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
469 Id. at 138.
470 Id.
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Jones and Kyllo arguably have already begun fulfilling Justice Bren-
nan's prediction. Both decisions may serve to protect against active
detection devices being used on the home, but the question of
whether a passive biological device can be used appears open. In
Jardines the Court has the opportunity to clarify Caballes and rein-
vigorate Kyllo. By restating that "all details [of a home] are inti-
mate," 41 and "a search is a search" 472 absent plain view, the Court
can resolve the question of whether Americans can still claim their
homes as their castles.
471 Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
472 Hicks, 480 U.S. at 325.
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